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INTRODUCTION 
The situation in Kenya culminating in the confirmation of charges 
against four individuals for crimes against humanity in the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) has significantly enhanced understanding of 
fundamental concepts contained within the Rome Statute, the Court’s 
controlling statute.
1
 For example, the jurisprudence in this case has further 
elucidated the principle of proprio motu as set forth in the Rome Statute as 
well as the particular contexts in which it may be appropriate for the 
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 1. See infra notes 239 through 246 and accompanying text. In May 2013, the charges against 
one defendant, Mr. Muthaura, were dropped by the ICC Prosecutor; accordingly, three of the four 
defendants whose charges were confirmed by the ICC awaited trial: Mr. Ruto, Mr. Sang, and Mr. 
Kenyatta, the current President of the Republic of Kenya. See infra notes 239–40 & 246. Defendants 
Ruto and Sang’s trial was scheduled to begin on September 10, 2013. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc% 
200109/Pages/situation%20index.aspx (last visited Mar. 27, 2013) [hereinafter ICC Website]. 
Defendant Kenyatta’s trial has been postponed, and is now set to begin on October 7, 2014. Id. 
However, the trial opening against Kenyatta was vacated, and on December 5, 2014, the ICC 
Prosecutor filed a notice of withdraw of charges against Kenyatta. On March 13, 2015, the case against 
Kenyatta was officially terminated by the ICC. Id. Kenyatta is the current President of Kenya. Ruto is 
Deputy President. Id. Sang is the director of a major radio station in the Kenyan capital, Nairobi. Id. 
Kenyatta’s trial was postponed by the ICC Prosecutor due to problems with witnesses. See ICC 
Prosecutor: Evidence Insufficient to Try Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/20/world/africa/kenya-president-icc/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2014). Note 
that there is no immunity from prosecution before the ICC under the Rome Statute for governmental 
officials. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, art. 27 [hereinafter 
Rome Statute], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ADD16852-AEE9-4757-ABE7-
9CDC7CF02886/283503/RomeStatutEng1.pdf. Lastly, there is currently one additional suspect in the 
ICC Kenya case, Mr. Walter Osapiri Barasa. See ICC website, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200109/Pages/situation
%20index.aspx (last visited Mar. 28, 2015). An arrest warrant has now been issued by the ICC for Mr. 
Barasa for “offenses against the administration of justice,” in particular for allegedly influencing in a 
corrupt manner various ICC witnesses. Id. 
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Prosecutor to exercise her authority to investigate a case under this 
principle.
2
 The situation in Kenya also sheds further light on the 
fundamental concept of “complementarity” within the ICC system since it 
is the first time a state party has challenged the admissibility of a case 
before the ICC under this principle.
3
 In particular, the case provides 
further clarification of the evolving criteria to be used to determine if the 
ICC must defer to a national jurisdiction under the complementarity 
principle.  
This article will analyze in depth the Prosecutor’s request to investigate 
the situation in Kenya, the Pre-Trial Chamber’s (PTC’s) authorization of 
this investigation, Kenya’s application to the PTC to find the case 
inadmissible before the ICC under the complementarity principle, the 
determinations by the PTC and Appeals Chamber on the admissibility 
issue, and the PTC’s decision to issue summonses and subsequently 
 
 
 2. “Proprio motu” refers to the power of the ICC Prosecutor to investigate international crimes 
within the Court’s jurisdiction on his own initiative, as set forth in Article 15 of the Rome Statute. See 
Rome Statute art. 15. In particular, proprio motu allows the Prosecutor to submit a request to the Pre-
Trial Chamber (PTC) of the ICC to investigate alleged crimes against humanity or other qualifying 
international crimes under the Rome Statute. Id. Prior to submitting such a request, the Prosecutor 
must have a “reasonable basis” to believe that international crimes were in fact committed (“If the 
Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, he or she shall 
submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request for authorization of an investigation, together with any 
supporting material collected.”). Id. art 15 (3). See also id. art. 13. And see id. art. 5 (listing and 
describing the crimes over which the ICC currently has jurisdiction, including war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and genocide). See also id. art. 53 (1)(a) (“The Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the 
information made available to him or her, initiate an investigation unless he or she determines that 
there is no reasonable basis to proceed under this Statute. In deciding whether to initiate an 
investigation, the Prosecutor shall consider whether [inter alia]: (a) The information available to the 
Prosecutor provides a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has 
been or is being committed[.]”). Other considerations the Prosecutor must make in deciding whether to 
initiate an investigation include those related to complementarity and the interests of justice. See id. 
art. 53 (1)(b) & (c). The Situation in Kenya is the first time the Prosecutor has exercised Article 15 
powers. See ICC Prosecutor’s Application for Authorization to Open an Investigation in the Situation 
of Kenya, infra note 88, at 1.  
 3. See Thomas O. Hansen, A Critical Review of the ICC’s Recent Practice Concerning 
Inadmissibility Challenges and Complementarity, 13 MELB. J. INT’L L. 217, 222 (2012). 
Complementarity refers to the concept that if a national court with jurisdiction is able and willing to 
prosecute or investigate a person who has allegedly committed war crimes and/or other qualifying 
crimes under the Rome Statute, then the case involving those crimes is inadmissible before the ICC. 
Id. In relevant part, the complementarity principle in Article 17 reads as follows:  
[T]he Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where: (a) The case is being 
investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is 
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution; (b) The case has 
been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to 
prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or 
inability of the State genuinely to prosecute. . . 
Rome Statute art. 17(1)(a) & (b). Unwillingness and inability for purposes of this complementarity 
provision are also defined in article 17. See id. art. 17(2) & (3). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss4/7
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confirm charges for particular Kenyan defendants. Not only does this 
analysis provide a more nuanced understanding of the proprio motu power 
and complementarity principle that are central to the ICC’s functioning 
and continued existence but it also helps to illuminate the evolution of the 
Kenya case from its pre-trial stages to its current point at the beginning of 
the trials, which have begun against two of the four individuals whose 
charges related to the post-election violence in Kenya were confirmed by 
the ICC.
4
 These individuals include prominent Kenyan officials, including 
the current Kenyan Deputy President.
5
 
This article consists of seven parts. Part I of the article provides 
background information pertaining to the situation in Kenya, summarizing 
the events and factors that led up to the post-election violence. Part II will 
address the efforts made by the Kenyan government to address the 
violence and punish the perpetrators of the post-election violence, 
including the formation of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election 
Violence (CIPEV), or Waki Commission.
6
 Part III highlights important 
aspects of ICC law as it relates to the progress of the Kenya case thus far. 
Part IV is devoted to the PTC’s authorization of the Prosecutor’s request 
to commence an investigation proprio motu into the situation in Kenya. 
Part V discusses Kenya’s application to the PTC to find the case 
inadmissible under the complementarity principle, and the PTC’s and 
Appeal Chamber’s “precedent-setting” response. Part VI will examine the 
summonses issued and charges confirmed against particular Kenyan 
defendants, two of whom continue to face charges before the Court. Part 
VII will explore the impact and implications to date of the Kenya case for 
future ICC investigations and prosecutions. In particular, it will analyze 
 
 
 4. ICC Website, supra note 1. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See International Center for Transitional Justice, The Kenyan Commission of Inquiry into 
Post-Election Violence, available at http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Kenya-Dialogue-Inquiry-
2008-English.pdf (last visited July 22, 2013), at 1. “The Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election 
Violence (CIPEV) was the outcome of the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Accord of 
February 28, 2008, negotiated by Kofi Annan and the Panel of Eminent African Personalities, and its 
sister agreement of March 4, 2008, known as Agenda Item 4, which called for the establishment of a 
number of bodies of inquiry to address justice and accountability and longer-term issues of governance 
and the rule of law.” Id. See also THE KENYA NATIONAL DIALOGUE AND RECONCILIATION (KNDR) 
MONITORING PROJECT, at 1, available at http://kofiannanfoundation.org/sites/default/files/Microsoft 
%20Word%20-%20South%20Consulting%20-%20Monitoring%20and%20Evaluation%20 Report.pdf 
(explaining that the parties to KNDR agreed to establish CIPEV). CIPEV is commonly referred to as 
the “Waki Commission.” Mba Chidi Nmaju, Violence in Kenya: Any Role for the ICC in the Quest for 
Accountability?, 4 AFR. J. OF LEG. STUD. 78 (2009). See also International Center for Transitional 
Justice: The Kenyan Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence, available at 
http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Kenya-Dialogue-Inquiry-2008-English.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 
2014). 
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the Pre-Trial Chamber’s “supervisory” role over the ICC Prosecutor’s 
proprio motu power and the criteria offered by the ICC judges with which 
to assess the complementarity issue.  
Ultimately, the Article argues that the Kenya case supports the notion 
that the PTC is taking its supervisory role “seriously” by placing 
reasonable limits on the Prosecutor’s potentially broad and robust proprio 
motu power. In addition, in light of the somewhat overly rigid test for 
states created by the ICC in the Kenya case through which to evaluate the 
complementarity principle (i.e., the “same person, substantially the same 
conduct” test), the Article puts forth an alternative test that aims to be 
more responsive to the shared role of national jurisdictions and the ICC 
under the Rome Statute in combating and ending impunity for grave 
crimes. This test is supported, in part, by both the Rome Statute and recent 
jurisprudence by the Court in the Libya case. In light of the shared role, 
the Article proposes that the definition of “investigation” for purposes of 
the complementarity principle be expanded to include less “traditional” 
methods used by states to address periods of mass crime, such as truth 
commissions and other local approaches. In this way, state sovereignty 
would be further protected from undue encroachment by the Court. 
Finally, the Article, while ultimately agreeing with the ICC finding of 
admissibility under the complementarity principle in the Kenya case, 
suggests that Kenya still has a more limited opportunity to end ICC 
intervention in the case if it begins to sufficiently investigate or prosecute 
grave crimes related to the post-election violence. This opportunity, 
however, is quickly diminishing as the ICC trials have begun against two 
of the four defendants for whom charges were confirmed, including 
Kenya’s Deputy President. Moreover, Kenya’s own truth commission 
recently revealed in its final report that the Kenyan government still needs 
to investigate further perpetrators of the election-related violence.  
I. BACKGROUND 
Kenya ratified the Rome Statute in March of 2005 and became a state 
party to the ICC.
7
 By becoming a state party, Kenya accepted the 
jurisdiction of the Court in certain cases over international crimes 
committed on its territory or by one of its nationals, thereby opening the 
 
 
 7. See ICC Website, “State Parties to the Rome Statute,” http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/ 
asp/states%20parties/african%20states/Pages/kenya.aspx (last visited July 5, 2013); see also United 
Nations website, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, http://treaties.un.org/doc/ 
Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20II/Chapter%20XVIII/XVIII-10.en.pdf (July 17, 1998).  
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door for the ICC prosecutor’s investigation into potential international 
criminal acts within Kenya. In particular, the Court would be able to 
exercise its jurisdiction in certain cases over war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and genocide committed by Kenyan nationals or on Kenyan 
territory on or after March 15, 2005, the date that Kenya ratified the Rome 
Statute.
8
 
The conflict that occurred in Kenya in the 2007 post-election period 
was a product of deep-rooted ethnic rivalries.
9
 Rivalries between the 
Masaai and Kikuyu ethnicities
10
 stem from disputes over land allocations 
by government leaders in the Rift Valley since the post-independence 
period in Kenya.
11
 In Kenya, political leaders have been successful in 
aligning their platforms along ethnic lines and polarizing the country. 
Kenya’s political scene focuses on ethnicity as opposed to the performance 
of politicians. Clashes in the Rift Valley are not new phenomena in Kenya; 
indeed, violence has erupted in Kenya around election time in recent years 
and investigations have identified political leaders as the main culprits of 
this violence.
12
 Along with this political involvement in election-time 
violence, there has been a culture of impunity toward the perpetrators of 
violence.
13
 There has been no previous legal action taken against those that 
are alleged to have incited violence prior to 2007. This history of violence 
and impunity laid the groundwork for the violent outbreaks that followed 
the December 2007 elections.
14
  
Even though the political violence in Kenya has very deep roots, the 
actual trigger for the violence that began after the December 2007 
 
 
 8. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 5, 11, 12 (1) & (2).  
 9. Human Rights Watch, Ballots to Bullets, 12 (2008) [hereinafter Ballots to Bullets] available 
at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/kenya0308/.  
 10. “Kenya is made up of over 40 different ethnic groups: The three largest groups are the 
Kikuyu, the Luhya . . . and the Luo.” Ballots to Bullets, supra note 9, at 13. The Masaai and Kalenjin 
ethnicities inhabited the area known now as the Rift Valley before British occupation. The Rift Valley 
area is now currently inhabited by the Kikuyus, which are the majority in Kenya.  
 11. “After independence the new government under Jomo Kenyatta did not recognize customary 
land use in law or practice but instead sold the land it acquired from British settlers under the principle 
of ‘willing seller, willing buyer.’ But much of the land ended up in the hands of members of 
Kenyatta’s Kikuyu ethnic group rather than with the communities from which it had been taken 
[during the colonial period].” See Ballots to Bullets, supra note 9, at 12–13. 
 12. Ballots to Bullets, supra note 9, at 18. See also The Report of the Judicial Commission 
Appointed to Inquire into the Tribal Clashes in Kenya [hereinafter The Akiwumi Report], available at 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2002/10/31/kenya-report-politicians-fueled-ethnic-violence (last visited July 
22, 2013).  
 13. See Ballots to Bullets, supra note 9, at 19.  
 14. In 1992 and 1997, there were eruptions of violence during election time. During both 
campaigns the violence was directly linked to the incumbent President Moi’s party (KANU) and 
proved to be purely politically motivated and instigated. UNITED NATIONS FINDING MISSION TO 
KENYA, 2/2008, 6, available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/OHCHR%20Kenya%20Report.pdf.  
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elections was the manipulation of the election outcome. Before the 
election took place, the campaign atmosphere was dominated by socio-
ethnic polarization between the communities of the two main contenders: 
Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga.
15
 This polarization, in turn, led to an 
extremely hostile environment in the candidates’ respective strongholds. 
Leaflets were circulated and text messages were sent from undisclosed 
locations containing hate speech from both of the contenders’ camps.16  
Some violence began to break out prior to the actual election;
17
 
however, the strongest and most widespread violence began hours after the 
results were announced.
18
 The beginning stages of the tabulation process 
indicated that opposition leader Raila Odinga carried a lead of about a 
million votes.
19
 Even though there were reported irregularities throughout 
the election process, it was towards the end of tallying the votes where the 
most damaging acts of fraud were committed.
20
 In particular, when the 
Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) presided over the tallying 
processes, it was seen by many as a “desperate last-minute attempt to rig 
the contest in favor of incumbent Mwai Kibaki.”21 The lead by Mr. Odinga 
quickly ceased to exist under reported irregular proceedings, which in turn 
resulted in a victory for Mr. Kibaki by a very slim margin of votes.
22
  
The electoral processes were soon engulfed in confusion. The Kenyan 
public became quite upset and there was also pressure from other outlets 
 
 
 15. See id. at 7–8. Mwai Kibaki, elected in 2002, was the incumbent in the 2007 elections, 
representing the Party of National Unity (PNU), which is mainly comprised of Kikuyu people. Id. at 
6–7. Raila Odinga was a candidate in the 2007 elections and current Prime Minister under a power-
sharing agreement negotiated by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Id. at 5, 7. Odinga is of 
Luo ethnicity and represents the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), which is mainly supported by 
the Luo, Luyha, Kalenjin and Maasai populations, among others. Id. at 7. 
 16. See generally European Union Election Observation Mission (EUEOM), Kenya Final 
Report: Elections December 27, 2007 (2008) [hereinafter Kenya Final Report], 21, available at 
http://eeas.europa.eu/eueom/missions/2013/kenya/pdf/eu-eom-kenya-2013-final-report_en.pdf (last visited 
July 22, 2013). 
 17. Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR), ON THE BRINK OF A PRECIPICE: A 
HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNT OF KENYA’S POST-2007 ELECTION VIOLENCE FINAL REPORT [hereinafter 
On the Brink of a Precipice], at 20 (2008), available at http://fidakenya.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2013/08/khrc-report...on-the-blink.pdf. 
 18. Human Rights Watch, Ballots to Bullets, 12 (2008) [hereinafter Ballots to Bullets], available 
at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/kenya0308/, at 8–9, 23. 
 19. Ballots to Bullets, supra note 9, at 22. 
 20. Id. at 21. See also Kenya Elections Domestic Observation Forum (KEDOF), Preliminary 
Press Statement and Verdict of 2007 Kenya’s General Elections [hereinafter Preliminary Press 
Statement] (2007), available at http://kenyastockholm.files. wordpress.com/2008/01/kedof-statement-
31-12-07.pdf (last visited July 22, 2013). 
 21. Ballots to Bullets, supra note 9, at 21–22.  
 22. Id. at 22. The results of the election were also in direct conflict with the parliamentary vote in 
which the ODM won 99 seats to the PNU’s 43 seats. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss4/7
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to reverse the election outcome.
23
 From this outcry over the electoral 
process, officials from the electoral commission “denounced the apparent 
fraud;” furthermore, the head of the ECK announced that he was 
personally unsure of which candidate actually won the election.
24
 In the 
face of this clearly disputed result, and before the public had time to voice 
their “concerns” over the skewed election results, Mr. Kibaki quickly had 
himself sworn into another term in office.
25
 At that point, election 
observers issued reports “condemning the tallying process” officially 
casting doubt on the election outcome.
26
  
In addition to the uncertainties surrounding the results of the election 
and the hurried swearing in of Mr. Kibaki, the press was ordered to 
suspend live broadcasts of the elections.
27
 This action led to rising levels 
of anxiety among Kenyans because they were unable to examine the 
election process.
28
 As a result of the delay in making election results 
known, incidents of violence began to emerge in Kenya. Once the results 
were finally announced publicly, the violence spread.
29
 There have been 
explicit reports by different agencies that the violence that ensued was, in 
fact, not spontaneous; indeed, overwhelming evidence exists suggesting 
the actual planning of violence.
30
 There have also been reports of evidence 
of violence perpetrated by police that include use of excessive and lethal 
force.
31
 Furthermore, there have been recommendations in reports from 
various organizations for the pursuit of war criminals domestically;
32
 
however, the recommendations also include that appropriate action be 
taken by the international community, namely the ICC, should the 
perpetrators not be actively pursued in domestic courts.
33
 
 
 23. See id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. at 23. See also Kenya Final Report, supra note 16, at 31–37; see generally Preliminary 
Press Statement, supra note 20.  
 27. See Kenya Final Report, supra note 16, at 2, 22–23.  
 28. See Ballots to Bullets, supra note 9, at 23. 
 29. See id. 
 30. See id. at 4. For example, there were numerous statements from victims of the violence who 
said that they were being threatened with violent evictions before the actual outbreak of violence 
started. There were also leaflets circulated that warned of violent evictions of the Kikuyu people. See 
generally On the Brink of a Precipice, supra note 17.  
 31. Ballots to Bullets, supra note 9, at 24. See generally On the Brink of a Precipice, supra note 
17.  
 32. Ballots to Bullets, supra note 9, at 8, 65. 
 33. See On the Brink of a Precipice, supra note 17, at 4, 10. See also Ballots to Bullets, supra 
note 9, at 6. 
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II. THE KENYAN RESPONSE: THE WAKI COMMISSION AND EFFORTS TO 
PROSECUTE  
In the weeks following the outbreak of violence, the Kibaki 
administration did not make any real and tangible efforts to end the 
violence until there were interventions from the international community 
in the form of negotiations to end the violence. In particular, a power-
sharing agreement was reached with the intervention of Kofi Annan two 
months after the violence began.
34
 The formal signing of the National 
Accord and Reconciliation Act of 2008 finally brought relief to the 
Kenyan community.
35
 The agreement included forming a coalition 
government and a complete overhaul of Kenya’s governmental practices.36 
This agreement has been identified as the first potential step in cultivating 
a culture of respect for human rights in Kenya. With that said, a clear 
obstacle to this culture is the opposing culture of impunity in Kenya.
37
  
The power-sharing agreement negotiated by Kofi Annan called for the 
creation of a Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission
38
 and a 
 
 
 34. Ballots to Bullets, supra note 9, at 8, 67. 
 35. The National Accord and Reconciliation Act, No. 4, (2008), available at http://kenyalaw.org/ 
kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/NationalAccordandReconciliationAct_No4of2008.pdf; See also Ballots 
to Bullets, supra note 9, at 63. 
 36. See generally Ballots to Bullets, supra note 9, at 63–64, 67.  
 37. Id. at 8, 63. 
 38. Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation, Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission 
(2008), available at http://www.hdcentre.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Our_work/Peacemaking/Kenya/ 
Supporting_documents/8-Truth-Justice-and-Reconciliation-Commission-Kenya-National-Dialogue-
and-Reconciliation-4-March-2008.pdf. This document outlines the principles that were agreed upon 
during negotiations in the creation of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission. The Kenyan 
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission’s mandate was to: 
[P]romote peace, justice, national unity, healing, and reconciliation among the people of 
Kenya by . . . (a) establishing an accurate, complete and historical record of violations and 
abuses of human rights and economic rights inflicted on persons by the State, public 
institutions and holders of public office, both serving and retired, between 12th December, 
1963 and 28th February 2008, including the . . . (i) antecedents, circumstances, factors and 
context of such violations; (ii) perspectives of the victims; and (iii) motives and perspectives 
of the persons responsible for commission of the violations, by conducting investigations and 
holding hearings.  
See The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Act, 2008, art. 5 (a), available at http://www.tjrckenya.org/ 
images/documents/TJRC-Act.pdf. The Commission also was charged with investigating human rights 
abuses and determining which individuals were responsible for these abuses. See id. art. 5(c). The 
Commission was to recommend prosecution of those responsible. See id. art. 5 (d). It was to also 
provide recommendations to redress wrongs suffered by the victims of these abuses. See id. art. 5(e). It 
was also to provide an opportunity for victims and others to explain the abuses, and for perpetrators to 
seek and promote reconciliation by confessing their misdeeds. See id. at 5(g)-(i). Amnesty was 
possible for certain perpetrators who came before the truth commission and revealed all of the facts 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss4/7
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Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence (CIPEV).
39
 CIPEV, 
which is more commonly known as the Waki Commission, was 
specifically charged with investigating the violence that took place 
following the 2007 elections and making recommendations concerning the 
prevention of similar, future violence (including recommendations related 
to bringing to justice those responsible for the violence, ending impunity, 
and fostering reconciliation).
40
 The Waki Commission produced a report 
handed to Messrs. Kibaki, Odinga and Annan in October 2008 that 
included key findings with respect to the violence and recommendations 
regarding the pursuit of justice.
41
 These recommendations included the 
creation of a Special Tribunal for Kenya.
42
 This Tribunal represented an 
opportunity for Kenya to pursue the perpetrators of the violence 
domestically, including through the investigation and prosecution of 
crimes such as crimes against humanity.
43
 The Special Tribunal was to be 
enacted through statute and tied to the Constitution of Kenya to prevent 
any objections based on the validity of the Tribunal.
44
 Although the Waki 
Commission’s report sought to provide a domestic avenue to pursue 
justice, it also included fair warning that should a Tribunal not be formed 
domestically within the mandated time frame, further action would be 
taken, including transmitting to the ICC Prosecutor a list of individuals 
suspected of bearing the greatest responsibility for crimes related to the 
post-election violence.
45
 
 
 
underlying the abuses for which they were responsible. See id. at 5 (f). For further discussion of the 
amnesty issue, see infra note 274. On May 3, 2013, the Commission issued its final report. For a 
description of the report, see infra notes 274–76 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 264, 
266–67. 
 39. See also Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation: Commission of Inquiry on Post-
Election Violence, available at http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/sites/default/files/LCIL/documents/transitions/ 
Kenya_14_KNDR_Commission_of_Inquiry.pdf. This is the document which mandates the creation of 
the Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence (CIPEV). Id. The chairman of the commission 
was Justice Philip Waki, a judge from Kenya’s Court of Appeal. See International Center for 
Transitional Justice: The Kenyan Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence, supra note 6, at 
1. CIPEV is commonly referred to as the Waki Commission. Id. 
 40. See International Center for Transitional Justice: The Kenyan Commission of Inquiry into 
Post-Election Violence, supra note 6, at 1. 
 41. CIPEV Final Report [hereinafter Waki Report], available at http://www.kenyalaw.org/ 
Downloads/Reports/Commission_of_Inquiry_into_Post_Election_Violence.pdf. This is the report 
produced by the Waki Commission.  
 42. See Waki Report at 472–75.  
 43. Waki Report at 472. One of the principal crimes that the Special Tribunal was to adjudicate 
was crimes against humanity. Id.  
 44. Id. at 473.  
 45. Id. “If either an agreement for the establishment of the Special Tribunal is not signed, or the 
Statute for the Special Tribunal fails to be enacted, or the Special Tribunal fails to commence 
functioning as contemplated above, or having commenced operating its purposes are subverted, a list 
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The Waki Commission also made quite clear in its report that it 
possessed a list of the names of the principal, alleged perpetrators of the 
violence;
46
 however, it did not mention the individuals that were most 
responsible for inciting the violence.
47
 In part, this was done in an effort to 
avoid compromising the integrity of the sensitive information pending the 
creation of the Special Tribunal.
48
 Even so, the Waki Commission was 
serious about bringing the individuals to justice. The report outlined that 
the names of the alleged perpetrators would be placed in a sealed envelope 
along with the supporting evidence until the Special Tribunal was created 
in compliance with the Waki Report’s recommendations.49 The report also 
explicitly stated that if there was a failure in constituting the Tribunal, the 
list of the alleged perpetrators’ names would be forwarded to the 
Prosecutor of the ICC in The Hague to conduct further investigations and 
possible prosecutions.
50
 
Furthermore, the Waki Commission expressed concerns over Kenya’s 
legal system in prosecuting those responsible for the most serious crimes. 
The report describes an extremely weak criminal justice system. In 
particular, the report highlights a flawed investigative process that in 
recent history has laid the foundation for a culture of impunity.
51
 The poor 
investigative processes of the Kenyan criminal justice system have 
impacted the outcomes of proper prosecution and adjudication, and that, in 
turn, has led to virtually no successful prosecutions of perpetrators of 
 
 
containing names of and relevant information on those suspected to bear the greatest responsibility for 
crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the proposed Special Tribunal shall be forwarded to the 
Special Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. The Special Prosecutor shall be requested to 
analyze the seriousness of the information received with a view to proceeding with an investigation 
and prosecuting such suspected persons.” Id.  
 46. See International Center for Transitional Justice: The Kenyan Commission of Inquiry into 
Post-Election Violence, supra note 6, at 2. See also Waki Report at 15–18. 
 47. Waki Report at 17–18 (“The Commission has carefully weighed the choices available to it 
and has decided against publishing the names of alleged perpetrators in its report. Instead, these names 
will be placed in a sealed envelope, together with its supporting evidence. Both will be kept in the 
custody of the Panel of African Eminent Personalities pending the establishment of a special tribunal 
to be set up in accordance with our recommendations. In default of setting up the Tribunal, 
consideration will be given by the Panel to forwarding the names of alleged perpetrators to the special 
prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague to conduct further investigations in 
accordance with the ICC statutes. This is a major recommendation made by the Commission.”). Id. at 
18.  
 48. Id. at 17. Names were also not released because most of the individuals suspected of 
committing election-related crimes could not be given an opportunity before the Commission to 
properly respond to the accusations. Id. at 16.  
 49. Id. at 18. See also supra note 43.  
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. at 449–54.  
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violence.
52
 With the lack of credible investigations, individuals and 
organized groups have continued to commit crimes with the assumption 
that they will not be held accountable. 
The Waki Commission’s report also indicated that while it conducted 
its hearings, “the Attorney General [of Kenya] appointed a joint team of 
his [own] officers and police officers to review all cases related to [the] 
post-election violence . . . No results of such exercise were furnished to 
the Commission, despite requests and promises . . . .”53 The report also 
describes the overall lack of political will in prosecuting such serious 
crimes.
54
 This lack of will to prosecute appears to stem, in part, from the 
authorities fearing reprisals by the political leadership and populace.
55
 
Moreover, the manner in which the authorities handled the Akiwumi 
Report in the recent past further diminishes confidence in the current 
Kenyan criminal justice system because authorities essentially ignored the 
Report and its recommendations related to the issue of ethnic violence.
56
  
There have also been ongoing issues related to perceived lack of 
independence and impartiality of the judiciary in Kenya.
57
 In particular, 
the judiciary has gained the reputation of failing to adequately provide 
democratic governance in Kenya.
58
 This also has had a direct impact on 
the post-election violence of 2007, in that the ODM refused to accept the 
jurisdiction of the courts to settle the disputed election results.
59
 The clear 
distrust of the judiciary by prominent Kenyans further highlights the 
weakness associated with domestic prosecutions.
60
 
Amid the concerns on the state of the criminal justice system there 
have also been concerns regarding existing legal frameworks in Kenya. 
The Kenyan Penal Code does not include specific language regarding 
crimes against humanity.
61
 As a result, grave human rights violations are 
 
 
 52. Id. at 454. 
 53. Id.  
 54. See generally id. at 456–60. This section of the “Waki Report” is titled “Lack of political will 
and fear of the political establishment.” Id. at 456. 
 55. See id. at 457. 
 56. Id at 456. See generally Akiwumi Report, supra note 12. See also Kenya Report: Politicians 
Fueled Ethnic Violence, HUMANRIGHTSWATCH.COM, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2002/10/31/kenya-
report-politicians-fueled-ethnic-violence (last visited March 20, 2015).  
 57. Waki Report. at 460. 
 58. Id. at 460–61. This section of the report also discusses on-going reforms of the judiciary to 
restore faith in the system. See id. at 461. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Kenyan Penal Code, Sections 202–207, available at http://www.kenyalaw.org/ 
Downloads/GreyBook/8.%20The%20Penal%20Code.pdf (last visited July 26, 2013). These sections 
of the Kenyan Penal Code specifically address murder and manslaughter but do not contain any 
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not recognized as being more serious than murder, assault, or the like. 
Also the penal code does not effectively separate the direct perpetrators 
from the planners, high-level instigators, and financiers of violence. Thus, 
these two groups—perpetrators and planners—are subject to the same 
judicial proceedings and punishments.
62
 This lack of clear delineation 
between planners and perpetrators also makes it difficult to prosecute the 
planners domestically if they have not actually committed the atrocities. 
Unfortunately, absence of prosecution in this regard only further 
contributes to the culture of impunity among the upper echelons of the 
perpetrators of violence.  
Human rights groups in Kenya as well as the Waki Commission had 
voiced serious concerns regarding the domestic prosecution of the 
perpetrators based on the recent history of impunity for ethnically and 
politically motivated clashes.
63
 The human rights organizations and the 
Commission were adamant about reversing the culture of impunity and 
had indicated that the international community, namely the ICC, be 
involved if no action was taken domestically.
64
 Furthermore, the 
recommendations stemming from the Kenya National Commission on 
Human Rights (KNCHR) and the Waki Commission have set forth 
mandates which state that a failure to institute a Special Tribunal in Kenya 
domestically would lead to action involving the ICC. Indeed, both 
commissions had in fact called upon the ICC to remain at arm’s length 
during the evolution of the domestic processes.
65
  
The effort of the Kenyans to prosecute the perpetrators of the post-
election violence of 2007 domestically had been minimal at best. The 
Waki Commission’s recommendations to create a Special Tribunal were 
rejected by the Kenyan Parliament. In particular, in February of 2009, the 
Parliament of Kenya struck down the proposal to amend the National 
Constitution to create the government sponsored Special Tribunal.
66
 The 
 
 
sections appropriate for prosecuting those who bear the most responsibility for the post-election 
violence (e.g., the Code lacks the possible charge of crimes against humanity). Id. 
 62. See id. at 202–07. 
 63. See generally On the Brink of a Precipice, supra note 17. See also Waki Report, supra note 
41, at 445–460. 
 64. See generally On the Brink of a Precipice, supra note 17. See also Waki Report, supra note 
41, at 470. 
 65. See On the Brink of a Precipice, supra note 17, at section entitled “Recommendations.” See 
also Waki Report, supra note 41, at 17–18, 473. See also supra notes 45 & 50. 
 66. Auriele Coppin and Lucia DiCicco, Communications to the ICC Regarding the Situation in 
Kenya [hereinafter Communications to the ICC] (2009), at 3, available at http://amicc.org/ 
docs/Kenya.pdf (last visited Aug. 3, 2013); See also Annan, H.E. Kofi, Statement from the Chair of 
the Panel of Eminent African Personalities, KENYA NATIONAL DIALOGUE AND RECONCILIATION 
(2009), available at http://www.dialoguekenya.org/pressmedia/13-Feb-2009%20-%20Press%20 
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following day Kofi Annan was set to release the names of the officials that 
had been suspected to have incited the violence and that had been provided 
to him by the Waki Commission to the Prosecutor of the ICC. However, 
Mr. Annan announced that he would afford more time to Kenya in their 
efforts to create the Special Tribunal.
67
 He also expressed that he would 
forward the list of names and supporting documents to the ICC, if no 
arrangement to create the Special Tribunal had been made in a reasonable 
amount of time.
68
 On July 3, 2009, a delegation from Kenya met with ICC 
Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo in The Hague to discuss the situation. 
The outcome of the meetings resulted in Mr. Annan handing over the list 
of names and supporting evidence to the Prosecutor’s office of the ICC.69  
Upon receiving the evidence compiled by the Waki Commission the 
ICC Prosecutor supported a three-pronged approach to address the post-
election violence, in which the ICC would prosecute those most 
responsible for the crimes, a national Special Tribunal would be instituted 
for other perpetrators, and a Justice, Truth, and Reconciliation 
Commission (JTRC) would be created to investigate the full history of the 
past and shed light on how to prevent future atrocities.
70
 The Office of the 
Prosecutor (OTP) continued discussions with Kenyan officials regarding 
the situation and further reiterated that the evidence he received was 
compelling and further suggested that the evidence would meet the 
threshold for admissibility by the ICC.
71
 The Kenyan government 
continued to delay making any tangible steps to prosecute and was fast 
approaching a deadlock in choosing the appropriate avenues for seeking 
justice.
72
  
 
 
statement%20by%20H.E.%20Kofi%20Annan%20on%20the%20defeat%20of%20the%20Constitution
%20of%20Kenya%20Amendment%20Bill%20in%20Parliament..pdf (last visited Aug. 3, 2013). 
 67. Id. at 3. See also H.E. Kofi Annan, Statement from the Chair of the Panel of Eminent African 
Personalities, Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation, (2009) [hereinafter Statement from Kofi 
Annan], available at http://www.dialoguekenya.org/pressmedia/24-Feb-2009%20-%20Press%20 
statement%20from%20H.E.%20Kofi%20Annan%20on%20letters%20to%20the%20two%20principal
s..pdf (last visited Aug. 3, 2013). 
 68. See Communications to the ICC, supra note 66, at 3. See also Statement from Kofi Annan, 
supra note 67, at 1. 
 69. See Communications to the ICC, supra note 66, at 3. See also Statement from Kofi Annan, 
supra note 67.  
 70. Press Release, International Criminal Court, ICC Prosecutor Supports Three-Pronged 
Approach to Justice in Kenya (30 Sept. 2009), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/ 
press%20and%20media/press%20releases/press%20releases%20%282009%29/Pages/pr456.aspx (last 
visited Aug. 3, 2013). Regarding the development and evolution of the Kenyan Truth Commission, see 
supra note 38. 
 71. “Kenya: Leaving the Door Open.” Africa Confidential 50.20 (10/2009): 8. Print. 
 72. Id.  
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Based on the continued delay of the Kenyan government to effectively 
produce a mechanism for domestically holding accountable the 
perpetrators of violence, the OTP indicated that the national system would 
not be considered to be sufficient to prosecute those responsible.
73
 The 
evidence provided to the ICC Prosecutor by the Waki Commission, as 
well as other forms of communications to the OTP by human rights 
organizations and Kenyan officials, have solidified the Prosecutor’s view 
that crimes against humanity were in fact committed in Kenya’s period of 
post-election violence in 2007. The specific crimes that have sufficient 
supporting evidence, according to the Prosecutor, are the murders, rapes, 
deportations, forcible transfer of populations, political persecutions and 
various other inhumane acts that were perpetrated on a widespread and 
systematic scale by the political machines of Kenya.
74
 
III. RELEVANT ICC LAW 
The ICC Prosecutor must take several issues into account when 
deciding whether to pursue an investigation proprio motu. For example, 
the Prosecutor must consider whether there is reasonable cause to believe 
a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court is occurring or has occurred. In 
addition, she must evaluate the issue of complementarity as it relates to the 
shared role between the Court and individual state parties in prosecuting 
high-level international crime offenders.
75
 In this regard, the preamble of 
the Rome Statute states “. . . the International Criminal Court established 
under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal 
jurisdictions.”76 In addition, Article 1 of the Rome Statute provides, in 
relevant part, that  
 
 
 73. Id.  
 74. See Press Release, International Criminal Court Prosecutor, Kenya’s post election violence: 
ICC Prosecutor presents cases against six individuals for crimes against humanity (Dec. 15, 2010), 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/press%20 
releases%20%282010%29/Pages/pr615.aspx (last visited Aug. 3, 2013); see also Press Release, 
International Criminal Court, ICC judges grant the Prosecutor’s request to launch an investigation on 
crimes against humanity with regard to the situation in Kenya (Mar. 31, 2010), available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/press%20releases%20 
%282010%29/Pages/icc%20judges%20grant%20the%20prosecutor%E2%80%99s%20request%20to
%20launch%20an%20investigation%20on%20crimes%20a.aspx (last visited Aug. 3, 2013).  
 75. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 53 (1)(a)& (b) & Rule 48 of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence. See also supra note 1. 
 76. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at pmbl. ¶ 10. (“Emphasizing that the International Criminal 
Court established under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. . . .”).  
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An International Criminal Court is hereby established. It shall be a 
permanent institution and shall have the power to exercise its 
jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international 
concern, as referred to in this Statute, and shall be complementary 
to national criminal jurisdictions. The jurisdiction and functioning 
of the Court shall be governed by the provisions of this Statute.
77
 
Under the complementarity principle, which is related to the question of 
the admissibility of a particular case, the ICC Prosecutor must determine 
whether the relevant investigating or prosecuting nation state is able and 
willing to investigate or prosecute the case, or has, in good faith, decided 
not to prosecute. If any of these considerations apply, then the case is 
inadmissible before the ICC.
78
 Furthermore, and also related to the 
admissibility of a case, the ICC Prosecutor must consider whether the case 
is of sufficient seriousness, or “gravity,” to merit consideration by the 
Court. Finally, in deciding whether to initiate an investigation, the 
Prosecutor must determine whether the investigation would serve “the 
interests of justice.”79 
In addition, in accordance with the Rome Statute, the International 
Criminal Court is currently empowered to investigate and prosecute 
 
 
 77. Lijun Yang, On the Principle of Complementarity in the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, 4 CHINESE JOURNAL OF INTL LAW 121 (2005). See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 1. 
 78. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at pmbl. & art. 17 (1)(a)-(b) & 17(2)-(3) (addressing 
complementarity considerations for a case to be deemed admissible before the ICC). For the relevant 
ICC provisions related to complementarity, see supra note 3.  
 79. Article 17 addresses gravity—“[T]he Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where 
“[t]he case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.” See id. art. 17(1)(d). See 
also art. 53 (1)(b). For the interest of justice provision, see art. 53 (1)(c) (“Taking into account the 
gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe 
that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice.”). See also art. 53(2)(c)(“A prosecution is 
not in the interests of justice, taking into account all the circumstances, including the gravity of the 
crime, the interests of victims and the age or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator, and his or her role in 
the alleged crime[]”). The Article 17 admissibility decision also includes one additional 
consideration—whether the defendant has been legitimately tried by another court for the same 
international criminal conduct within the jurisdiction of the ICC (and for which the ICC intends to 
prosecute the defendant). See art. 17(1)(c) (“The person concerned has already been tried for conduct 
which is the subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under article 20, 
paragraph 3”). See also art. 20, ¶ 3 (“No person who has been tried by another court for conduct also 
proscribed under [the articles containing the crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction] shall be tried by 
the Court with respect to the same conduct unless the proceedings in the other court: (a) Were for the 
purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court; or (b) Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially in 
accordance with the norms of due process recognized by international law and were conducted in a 
manner which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to 
justice”). Id. art. 20(3). 
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instances of genocide,
80
 crimes against humanity,
81
 and war crimes.
82
 For 
the Court to be able to exercise its jurisdiction over a crime, certain “pre-
conditions” must be met: the alleged perpetrator either must be a national 
of a state party to the Rome Statute or the alleged crimes must occur on 
the territory of a state party.
83
 Finally, for the Court to exercise its 
jurisdiction, the case, or “situation,” must come before the Court in one of 
three ways: (i) the state party can refer a situation to the Court; (ii) the 
Security Council can refer a situation under Chapter VII; or (iii) the 
Prosecutor herself can initiate an investigation into a situation proprio 
motu.
84
  
In all cases, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) first investigates the 
entire situation—encompassing all alleged crimes and perpetrators 
potentially implicated by the evidence she receives—and subsequently 
builds cases against individual defendants for particular criminal conduct. 
If the Prosecutor officially decides to initiate an investigation proprio 
motu, she must first obtain authorization from the Pre-Trial Chamber.
85
 
 
 
 80. See id. art. 6 (“For the purpose of this Statute, ‘genocide’ means any of the following acts 
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as 
such. . .”). See also P.M. Wald, Genocide and Crimes against Humanity, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. 
L. REV. 621, 623 (2007). “The five genocidal acts are: killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, 
deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction, imposing 
measures designed to prevent births, and finally transferring children from a protected group to another 
group.” Id. 
 81. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7 (“For the purpose of this Statute, ‘crime against 
humanity’ means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: (a) Murder; 
(b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population; 
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of 
international law; (f) Torture; (g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, 
enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; (h) Persecution 
against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, 
gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible 
under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Court; (i) Enforced disappearance of persons; (j) The crime of apartheid; 
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to 
body or to mental or physical health.”). See also Wald, Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, supra 
note 80, at 623. Article 6(c) of the IMT (International Military Tribunal) Charter limited crimes against 
humanity, defined to include extermination, enslavement, deportation and subjection to inhumane. Id.  
 82. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8. 
 83. Id. art. 12(2) (a) & (b). 
 84. Id. art. 13. The Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII, encompasses articles 39–51 
which grant various discretionary powers to the Security Council, one of which has been interpreted to 
be power to refer cases to the ICC. UN Charter, Chapter VII, available at http://www.un.org/en/ 
documents/charter/chapter7.shtml (last visited July 26, 2013). 
 85. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 15 (3). See also supra note 2. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss4/7
  
 
 
 
 
2014] THE ICC KENYA CASE 715 
 
 
 
 
IV. PROSECUTOR’S REQUEST TO INVESTIGATE PROPRIO MOTU IN KENYA 
AND THE RESPONSE BY THE PTC 
On November 26, 2009 the Prosecutor formally requested that the 
Judges of the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) authorize investigations into 
the post-election violence that followed the 2007 elections.
86
 Under Article 
13 of the Rome Statute the ICC may exercise jurisdiction in one of the 
following three ways: (1) if the situation is referred to the Prosecutor by a 
State Party; (2) if it is referred by the Security Council of the United 
Nations; or (3) if the Prosecutor seeks to initiate an investigation.
87
 Article 
15 of the Rome Statute explicitly outlines the ability of the Prosecutor to 
initiate investigations absent a referral from either a state party or the 
Security Council.
88
  
An extremely important feature of the use of this principle is the 
submission of a formal request by the Prosecutor to the PTC for 
authorization of such an investigation.
89
 The PTC is, in turn, charged with 
the task of determining whether or not the request by the Prosecutor is in 
 
 
 86. See Request for Authorisation of an Investigation pursuant to Article 15, submitted to the 
Pre-Trial Chamber II from the Office of the Prosecutor (Nov. 26, 2009), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc785972.pdf (last visited Aug. 3, 2013).  
 87. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 13. 
 88. Article 15 of the Rome Statue states as follows:  
Prosecutor (1.) The Prosecutor may initiate investigations proprio motu on the basis of 
information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. (2.) The Prosecutor shall analyze 
the seriousness of the information received. For this purpose, he or she may seek additional 
information from States, organs of the United Nations, intergovernmental or non-
governmental organizations, or other reliable sources that he or she deems appropriate, and 
may receive written or oral testimony at the seat of the Court. (3.) If the Prosecutor concludes 
that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, he or she shall submit to the 
Pre-Trial Chamber a request for authorization of an investigation, together with any 
supporting material collected. Victims may make representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber, in 
accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. (4.) If the Pre-Trial Chamber, upon 
examination of the request and the supporting material, considers that there is a reasonable 
basis to proceed with an investigation, and that the case appears to fall within the jurisdiction 
of the Court, it shall authorize the commencement of the investigation, without prejudice to 
subsequent determinations by the Court with regard to the jurisdiction and admissibility of a 
case. (5.) The refusal of the Pre-Trial Chamber to authorize the investigation shall not 
preclude the presentation of a subsequent request by the Prosecutor based on new facts or 
evidence regarding the same situation. (6.) If, after the preliminary examination referred to in 
paragraphs 1 and 2, the Prosecutor concludes that the information provided does not 
constitute a reasonable basis for an investigation, he or she shall inform those who provided 
the information. This shall not preclude the Prosecutor from considering further information 
submitted to him or her regarding the same situation in the light of new facts or evidence.  
See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 15. 
 89. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 15(3). 
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accordance with the Rome Statute’s requirements for jurisdiction.90 The 
situation in Kenya is the first time that the Prosecutor has exercised his 
right to proprio motu.
91
  
Upon the PTC’s receipt of the request by the Prosecutor, the PTC 
judges held a hearing to determine whether there was a reasonable basis to 
grant the request.
92
 The PTC subsequently reviewed the information that 
was provided by the Prosecutor, which included various reports. On 
February 18, 2010 the PTC issued a response to the Prosecutor’s request. 
The chamber requested that the Prosecutor provide further information and 
clarification about the issues at hand.
93
 The information requested by the 
PTC included information on the incidents and groups of persons that will 
most likely be the focus of the investigations in Kenya along with any 
domestic investigations.
94
 The Prosecutor was also asked to provide 
information that would identify a link between “[the] events, the persons 
involved, the acts of violence allegedly committed . . . and, on the other 
hand, a policy of a State or one or more organizations.”95 On March 3, 
2010 the Prosecutor provided clarification regarding “criminal incidents 
that appear to have resulted from a State and/or organizational policy,” 
outlined investigations that would take place in regards to specific 
methods of senior level politicians and businessmen to incite violence, and 
additionally included a non-binding list of suspects that would be 
investigated to the PTC.
96
 The Prosecutor also noted that a “limited 
number” of judicial proceedings were pursued for minor offenses 
domestically but that no Special Tribunal had been created in Kenya to 
prosecute those “most responsible” for the crimes and indicated that the 
Kenyan government was “ready to provide [its] full cooperation to the 
ICC, including in the execution of arrest warrants.”97 The PTC reviewed 
 
 
 90. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 15 (4). 
 91. Tania Deigni, ICC Prosecutor’s Application for Authorization to Open an Investigation in the 
Situation of Kenya, at 1 (2010), available at http://amicc.org/docs/Kenya_Application.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 3, 2013). 
 92. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 15 (4). 
 93. “Decision Requesting Clarification and Additional Information” Submitted to the OTC from 
PTC II (Feb. 18, 2010), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc825223.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 3, 2013). 
 94. Id. ¶ 14. 
 95. Id. ¶ 13. 
 96. “Prosecution’s Response to Decision Requesting Clarification and Additional Information” 
Submitted to the PTC II by the OTP, 3 March 2010, 4, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ 
doc831129.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2013). 
 97. Id. ¶¶ 35–36.  
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the additional information and clarifications, deemed them to be sufficient, 
and approved the request of the Prosecutor on March 31, 2010.
98
 
The PTC, from the outset of the authorization decision approving the 
Prosecutor’s request to investigate the situation in Kenya, understood its 
importance. In particular, the Chamber commented that it would “examine 
the Prosecutor’s Request taking into consideration the sensitive nature and 
specific purpose of this procedure [i.e., Article 15 requests for authority to 
investigate proprio motu].”99  
Some of the key features of this decision lie in the analysis of the 
evidence by the judges of the PTC as it relates to the threshold 
admissibility requirements. The judges used the criteria of “admissibility” 
and “reasonable basis to proceed” to ensure the existing requirements of 
the OTP are met, and to further note that the PTC is held to the same legal 
standard.
100
 The PTC specifically refers to Article 53(1)(a-c) of the Rome 
Statute in the rationale for approving the investigation. In particular, the 
Judges stated “if upon review of the three elements [burden of proof, 
complementarity/gravity and interests of justice considerations] embodied 
in article 53(1)(a-c) of the Statute and on the basis of the information 
provided, the Chamber reaches an affirmative finding as to their 
fulfillment, the “reasonable basis to proceed” standard will 
consequentially be met.”101  
 
 
 98. “Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an 
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya” Submitted to the OTP from PTC II (Mar. 31, 
2010) (PTC Authorization of Investigation), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ 
doc854287.pdf (last visited Aug. 3, 2013). 
 99. Id. ¶ 18. 
 100. Id. ¶¶ 21–22. 
 101. Id. ¶ 26. Article 53 reads: 
Initiation of an investigation 
1. The Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information made available to him or her, 
initiate an investigation unless he or she determines that there is no reasonable basis to 
proceed under this Statute. In deciding whether to initiate an investigation, the Prosecutor 
shall consider whether: 
(a) The information available to the Prosecutor provides a reasonable basis to believe that a 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is 
being committed; 
(b) The case is or would be admissible under article 17 [i.e., complementarity and gravity 
provisions] ; and 
(c) Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, there are 
nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests 
of justice.  
See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 53. 
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A. Article 53(1)(a) The Information Available to the Prosecutor Provides 
a Reasonable Basis to Believe that a Crime has Been or is Being 
Committed 
The standard of “reasonable basis to believe a crime . . . has been 
committed” is the evidentiary burden of proof that the ICC Prosecutor 
must meet prior to commencing an investigation proprio motu.
102
 The 
PTC, in its authorization decision, accepted the “reasonable basis” test, 
which is described in conjunction with proprio motu in the Rome 
Statute.
103
 Additionally the PTC addressed the issue of the evidence 
presented by the Prosecutor, which must point to a “reasonable conclusion 
[that a crime within the Court’s jurisdiction has been committed].”104 
According to the PTC, the “reasonable basis to believe” test is the “lowest 
evidentiary standard provided for in the Statute.”105 This has been affirmed 
because at the early stage of proceedings the Prosecutor may not have 
“comprehensive” or “conclusive” information.106 Moreover, the PTC notes 
that the “reasonable basis to believe” standard is akin to “reasonable 
suspicion,” as that phrase is defined by the European Court of Human 
Rights—“the existence of facts or information which would satisfy an 
objective observer that the person concerned may have committed the 
offence.”107 The Chamber concludes the analysis of the reasonable basis to 
 
 
 102. Id. art. 53 (1)(a). 
 103. Id. art. 15(4).  
 104. See “PTC Authorization of Investigation,” supra note 98, ¶ 33. The Court notes that there 
may be more than one conclusion reached based on the evidence. The Court elaborates in this way:  
Rather, it is sufficient at this stage to prove that there is a reasonable conclusion alongside 
others (not necessarily supporting the same finding), which can be supported on the basis of 
the evidence and information available. . . . The Chamber considers that in the context of the 
present request, all the information provided by the Prosecutor certainly need not point 
towards only one conclusion. 
The Prosecutor is therefore not required to point to any one or specific conclusion at this stage of the 
proceeding. See id. ¶¶ 33–34. 
 105. See PTC Authorization of Investigation, supra note 98, ¶ 27. 
 106. Id. The Court notes that there may be more than one conclusion reached based on the 
evidence. The Court articulates this by stating that:  
Rather, it is sufficient at this stage to prove that there is a reasonable conclusion alongside 
others (not necessarily supporting the same finding), which can be supported on the basis of 
the evidence and information available. . . . [T]he Chamber considers that in the context of the 
present request, all the information provided by the Prosecutor certainly need not point 
towards only one conclusion. 
“PTC Authorization of Investigation,” supra note 98, ¶¶ 33–34. 
 107. Id. ¶ 31. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss4/7
  
 
 
 
 
2014] THE ICC KENYA CASE 719 
 
 
 
 
believe standard and the PTC’s role in evaluating that standard, in the 
following way:  
[T]he Chamber must be satisfied that there exists a sensible or 
reasonable justification for a belief that a crime falling within the 
jurisdiction of the Court ‘has been or is being committed.’ A finding 
on whether there is a sensible justification should be made bearing 
in mind the specific purpose underlying this procedure.
108
 
The second question raised in part (a) of Article 53 specifically looks to 
whether or not the Prosecutor meets the reasonable basis of a crime 
committed “within the jurisdiction of the Court.”109 The Chamber sets 
forth three guidelines for determining if the jurisdictional standard is met:  
Thus, the Chamber considers that for a crime to fall within the 
jurisdiction of the Court, as stated in Article 53, it has to satisfy the 
following conditions: (i) it must fall within the category of crimes 
referred to in article 5 and defined in articles 6, 7, and 8 of the 
Statute (jurisdiction ratione materiae); (ii) it must fulfill the 
temporal requirements specified under article 11 of the Statute 
(jurisdiction ratione temporis); and (iii) it must meet one of the two 
alternative requirements embodied in article 12 of the Statute 
(jurisdiction ratione loci or ratione personae). The latter entails 
either that the crime occurs on the territory of a State Party to the 
Statute or a State which has lodged a declaration . . ., or be 
committed by a national of any such State.
110
  
B. Article 53(1)(b) The Case is or Would be Admissible Under Article 17 
Within the context of the admissibility evaluation under article 17, 
which includes the complementarity and gravity determinations, the 
Chamber, in its authorization decision, first addresses the ambiguity that 
was associated with the terms “case” and “situation.” In this regard, the 
Chamber ultimately concludes that “since it is not possible to have a 
concrete case involving an identified suspect for the purpose of 
prosecution, prior to the commencement of an investigation, the 
admissibility assessment at this stage actually refers to the admissibility of 
one or more potential cases within the context of a situation.”111 Even 
 
 
 108. Id. ¶ 35. 
 109. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 53 (1)(a). 
 110. PTC Authorization of Investigation, supra note 98, ¶ 39. 
 111. Id. ¶ 48. 
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though the Court expresses that the admissibility evaluation focuses upon 
a potential case or cases within a situation, the Court also points out that 
this evaluation “cannot be conducted in the abstract.”112 The Court 
specifically notes that there must be a solid basis of information before the 
investigation can be approved. In particular, the Prosecutor must show 
evidence concerning the perpetrators and criminal incidents, “likely to 
shape his future [case or cases].”113 The Chamber then articulates the 
guidelines for assessing a “potential case:”  
Accordingly, admissibility at the situation phase should be assessed 
against certain criteria defining a “potential case” such as: (i) the 
groups of persons involved that are likely to be the focus of an 
investigation for the purpose of shaping the future case(s); and 
(ii) the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court allegedly 
committed during the incidents that are likely to be the focus of an 
investigation for the purpose of shaping the future case(s). The 
Prosecutor’s selection of the incidents or groups of persons that are 
likely to shape his future case(s) is preliminary in nature and is not 
binding for future admissibility assessments. This means that the 
Prosecutor’s selection on the basis of these elements for the 
purposes of defining a potential “case” for this particular phase may 
change at a later stage, depending on the development of the 
investigation.
114
  
Next, the Court squarely addresses the admissibility issue of 
complementarity within the context of its “potential cases” concept. In 
particular, the Chamber states that “[t]he admissibility assessment requires 
an examination as to whether the relevant State(s) is/are conducting or 
has/have conducted national proceedings in relation to the groups of 
persons and the crimes allegedly committed during those incidents, which 
together would likely form the object of the Court’s investigations. If the 
answer is in the negative, the “case would be admissible”, provided that 
the gravity threshold is also met.”115 In reference to the situation in Kenya, 
the Court recognizes that there is no need to assess an unwillingness or 
inability to investigate or prosecute the potential cases that may shape the 
Prosecutor’s case, within Kenya’s domestic court system:  
 
 
 112. Id. ¶ 49. 
 113. Id.  
 114. Id. ¶ 50. 
 115. Id. ¶ 52. 
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Thus, in the present scenario, it is not necessary to proceed to the 
second step [of the complementarity determination, regarding 
inability or unwillingness to investigate or prosecute] which 
requires an examination of the remaining parts of the [article 17 
complementarity] provision, since the available information 
indicates that there is a situation of inactivity with respect to the 
elements that are likely to shape the potential case(s).
116
 
Following its complementarity determination, the Chamber addressed the 
admissibility issue of gravity.
117
 The Court points out that the gravity 
requirement cannot be associated with a concrete case at this stage of the 
investigation and therefore should, like the complementarity 
determination, be based on the “potential cases” that may arise: “[G]ravity 
should be examined against the backdrop of the likely set of cases or 
‘potential case(s)’ that would arise from investigating the situation.”118 In 
addition the Court sets forth parameters for defining a potential case 
within this context. The Court explains that:  
As for the first element [i.e., the groups of persons that are 
investigated to form a potential case] the Chamber considers that it 
involves a generic assessment of whether such groups of persons 
that are likely to form the object of investigation capture those who 
may bear the greatest responsibility for the alleged crimes 
committed. . .As for the second element [the crimes committed 
during the incidents that are investigated to form a potential case], 
the Chamber is of the view that this mainly concerns the gravity of 
the crimes committed within the incidents, which are likely to be 
the focus of an investigation. In this regard, there is interplay 
between the crimes and the context in which they were committed 
(the incidents). Thus, the gravity of the crimes will be assessed in 
the context of their modus operandi.
119
 
The Chamber also discusses a qualitative assessment, or “test,” to 
determine gravity: 
In making its assessment, the Chamber considers that gravity may 
be examined following a quantitative as well as a qualitative 
 
 
 116. Id. ¶ 54. 
 117. The issue of gravity is a required component of the admissibility evaluation; in this regard, 
the Court notes that “. . . the gravity assessment is a mandatory component for the determination of the 
question of admissibility (under the Article 53 (1)(b) assessment).” See id. ¶ 57. 
 118. Id. ¶ 58. 
 119. Id. ¶¶ 60–61. 
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approach. Regarding the qualitative dimension, it is not the number 
of victims that matter but rather the existence of some aggravating 
or qualitative factors attached to the commission of crimes, which 
makes it grave. . . . These factors could be summarized as: (i) the 
scale of the alleged crimes (including assessment of geographical 
and temporal intensity); (ii) the nature of the unlawful behaviour or 
of the crimes allegedly committed; (iii) the employed means for the 
execution of the crimes (i.e., the manner of their commission); and 
(iv) the impact of the crimes and the harm caused to victims and 
their families.
120
 
C. Article 53(1)(c) Taking into Account the Gravity of the Crime and the 
Interests of Victims, there are Nonetheless Substantial Reasons to 
Believe that an Investigation Would Not Serve the Interests of Justice 
The Chamber then briefly addressed Article 53(1)(c), the interests of 
justice requirement. The PTC noted that it “does not require the Prosecutor 
to establish that an investigation is actually in the interests of justice. 
Indeed, the Prosecutor does not have to present reasons or supporting 
material in this respect. . . . It is only when the Prosecutor decides that an 
investigation would not be in the interests of justice that he or she is under 
the obligation to notify the Chamber of the reasons for such a decision, 
thereby triggering the review power of the Chamber.”121  
After the Chamber reviews the relevant law in approving the 
investigation, it looks to whether the criteria have been met by the OTP. 
The PTC recalls the jurisdictional parameters of ratione materiae, ratione 
temporis and alternatively rationae personae or ratione loci under article 
53.
122
 The Chamber proceeds to analyze each of the requirements. In the 
analysis of ratione materiae, the Chamber acknowledges that “[u]pon 
 
 
 120. Id. ¶ 62. 
 121. Id. ¶ 63. Lastly, the Chamber determines that the jurisdictional inquiry embedded within the 
Article 15 proprio motu authorization decision is met through the Article 53(1)(a) assessment. In this 
regard, “the Chamber finds that its determination of jurisdiction concerning the crimes as required 
under article 53(l)(a) of the Statute already covers the analysis of jurisdiction over any potential case 
pursuant to article 15(4) of the Statute”. Id. ¶ 65. Furthermore the Chamber finds that the Article 53 
jurisdictional assessment is sufficient:  
It follows from the above analysis that the Chamber is satisfied that a review of article 
53(l)(a)-(c) of the Statute is sufficient for the purpose of this procedure [related to examining 
whether the Court has jurisdiction over the crimes] and there is no need to duplicate its 
assessment of jurisdiction under article 15(4) of the Statute. 
Id. ¶ 68. 
 122. Id. ¶ 71.  
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examination of the available information, bearing in mind the nature of the 
present proceedings, the low threshold, as well as the object and purpose 
of this decision, the Chamber finds that the information available provides 
a reasonable basis to believe that crimes against humanity have been 
committed on Kenyan territory.”123 The Chamber then addresses the 
contextual elements of crimes against humanity and breaks them into 
distinguishable parts. The parameters are (i) an attack directed against any 
civilian population, (ii) a State or organizational policy, (iii) the 
widespread and systematic nature of the attack, and (iv) nexus between the 
individual and the attack.
124
  
The Chamber then analyzes each portion beginning with the first 
element of “an attack against any civilian population”. The Chamber 
articulates the meaning of “attack” as being “a campaign or operation 
carried out against the civilian population.”125 Additionally the Court 
states that an “attack consists of a course of conduct involving the multiple 
commission of acts referred to in article 7(1).”126 The Chamber then 
addresses the requirement of “directed against a civilian population:” “The 
Prosecutor will need to demonstrate, to the standard of proof applicable, 
that the attack was directed against the civilian population as a whole and 
 
 
 123. Id. ¶ 73. See also Rome Statute, supra note 1, at 53(1)(a). 
 124. PTC Authorization of Investigation, supra note 98, ¶ 79. Also, it is noted by the Chamber 
that a fifth requirement of “knowledge of the attack” cannot be assessed at this early phase of the 
proceedings because it speaks to the mental element under Article 30(3) and cannot be evaluated as of 
yet. Id. 
 125. Id. ¶ 80 (citing Elements of Crimes, Introduction to Article 7 of the Statute, ¶ 3). 
 126.  Id. ¶ 80 (citing Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the 
Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-
424, ¶ 75). Article 7(1)-(2)(a) of the Rome Statute reads as follows:  
1. For the purpose of this Statute, ‘crime against humanity’ means any of the following acts 
when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population, with knowledge of the attack: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement; 
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population; (e) Imprisonment or other severe 
deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; 
(f) Torture; (g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; (h) Persecution 
against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, 
religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized 
as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this 
paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; (i) Enforced disappearance of 
persons; (j) The crime of apartheid; (k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character 
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.  
 2. For the purpose of paragraph 1: (a) ‘Attack directed against any civilian population’ 
means a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 
1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational 
policy to commit such attack[.]”  
See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art.7.  
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not merely against randomly selected individuals.”127 Further stipulated is 
that:  
The Chamber need not be satisfied that the entire civilian 
population of the geographical area in question was being targeted. 
However, the civilian population must be the primary object of the 
attack in question and cannot merely be an incidental victim. The 
term ‘civilian population’ refers to persons who are civilians, as 
opposed to members of armed forces and other legitimate 
combatants.
128
 
The second element in determining whether crimes against humanity have 
been committed is “state or organizational policy” assessment. The 
Chamber notes that the terms “policy” or “state or organizational” are not 
defined in the Rome Statute and looks to stare decisis. In the previous case 
brought before the PTC against Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, the Chamber 
set forth the following assessment relative to this provision.  
[E]ven if [the attack is] carried out over a large geographical area or 
directed against a large number of victims, [it] must still be 
thoroughly organised and follow a regular pattern. It must also be 
conducted in furtherance of a common policy involving public or 
private resources. Such a policy may be made either by groups of 
persons who govern a specific territory or by any organisation with 
the capability to commit a widespread or systematic attack against a 
civilian population. The policy need not be explicitly defined by the 
organisational group. Indeed, an attack which is planned, directed or 
organised—as opposed to spontaneous or isolated acts of 
violence—will satisfy this criterion.129  
 
 
 127. Id. ¶ 81 (citing Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the 
Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-
424, ¶ 77). 
 128. Id. ¶ 82 (citing Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the 
Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01//05-01/08-
424, paragraph 76) (also citing various ICTR, ICTY and Geneva Convention provisions). 
 129. Id. ¶ 84 (citing Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ICC-01/04-
01/07-717, para. 396). See also id. ¶ 85 (quoting Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to Article 
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, ¶ 81) (“[t]he requirement of ‘a State or organizational policy’ implies 
that the attack follows a regular pattern. Such a policy may be made by groups of person who govern a 
specific territory or by any organization with the capability to commit a widespread or systematic 
attack against a civilian population. The policy need not be formalised. Indeed, an attack which is 
planned, directed or organized—as opposed to spontaneous or isolated acts of violence—will satisfy 
this criterion.”). 
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The Chamber also relies on the International Law Commission (ILC) and 
the jurisprudence of the previous special, ad hoc tribunals in Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda to interpret the legal contexts of the Rome Statute, especially 
within the assessment of crimes against humanity.
130
 The Chamber 
particularly looks to the ICTY in the case against Tihomir Blaskic when 
evaluating whether a “plan” exists in the context of “state or 
organizational policy”. In this case, the ICTY determined that the plan to 
commit attacks “need not necessarily be declared expressly or even stated 
clearly and precisely. It may be surmised from the occurrence of a series 
of events . . .”131 An important aspect of the “state and organizational 
policy” assessment is that an organization not linked to a state could fall 
under the scope of this requirement. In particular, the PTC found that 
organizations “not linked to a State may, for the purposes of the Statute, 
elaborate and carry out a policy to commit an attack against a civilian 
population.”132  
Next, the Court examines the third requirement of crimes against 
humanity—the “widespread or systematic nature of the attack.” The 
 
 
 130. See “PTC Authorization of Investigation,” supra note 98, ¶ 86. Particularly the Chamber 
mentions Article 18 of the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, which 
was adopted by the ILC in 1996 and the Chamber specifically mentions the ICTY and ICTR in 
solidifying the definition of “crimes against humanity.” 
 131.  Id. ¶ 87 (citing ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, 3 March 2000, 
¶ 204). The Blaskic decision mentioned the following “series of events:”  
(a) the general historical circumstances and the overall political background against which the 
criminal acts are set; (b) the establishment and implementation of autonomous political 
structures at any level of authority in a given territory; (c) the general content of a political 
programme, as it appears in the writings and speeches of its authors; (d) media propaganda; 
(e) the establishment and implementation of autonomous military structures; (f) the 
mobilisation of armed forces; (g) temporally and geographically repeated and co-ordinated 
military offensives; (h) links between the military hierarchy and the political structure and its 
political programme; (i) alterations to the “ethnic” composition of populations; 
(j) discriminatory measures, whether administrative or other (banking restrictions, laissez-
passer, . . .); (k) the scale of the acts of violence perpetrated—in particular, murders and other 
physical acts of violence, rape, arbitrary imprisonment, deportations and expulsions or the 
destruction of non-military property, in particular, sacral sites. 
Id. 
 132. Id. ¶ 92. Additionally, in paragraph 93 of its authorization decision, the PTC sets forth 
criteria for determining whether a particular group constitutes an organization under the Rome Statute:  
(a) whether the group is under a responsible command, or has an established hierarchy; 
(b) whether the group possesses, in fact, the means to carry out a widespread or systematic 
attack against a civilian population; (c) whether the group exercises control over part of the 
territory of a State; (d) whether the group has criminal activities against the civilian 
population as a primary purpose; (e) whether the group articulates, explicitly or implicitly, an 
intention to attack a civilian population; (f) whether the group is part of a larger group, which 
fulfills some or all of the abovementioned criteria.”  
Id. ¶ 93.  
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Chamber begins by addressing the fact that an alleged attack can be either 
widespread or systematic under this requirement for crimes against 
humanity.
133
 The Chamber articulates “only the attacks, and not the 
alleged individual acts, are required to be widespread or systematic.”134 
Then the PTC examines the respective terms “widespread” and 
“systematic.” The widespread element is described by the Chamber as “the 
element (that) refers to both the large-scale nature of the attack and the 
number of resultant victims.”135 Regarding this element, the Chamber 
further notes that “[t]he assessment is neither exclusively quantitative nor 
geographical, but must be carried out on the basis of the individual facts. 
Accordingly, a widespread attack may be the “cumulative effect of a series 
of inhumane acts or the singular effect of an inhumane act of extraordinary 
magnitude.”136  
When evaluating the term “systematic”, the PTC relies upon ICTR and 
ICTY precedent to posit the following criteria:  
(i) being thoroughly organised, (ii) following a regular pattern, 
(iii) on the basis of a common policy, . . . (iv) involving substantial 
public or private resources, [v] a political objective or plan, 
[vi] large-scale or continuous commission of crimes which are 
linked, [vii] use of significant public or private resources, and 
 
 
 133. PTC Authorization of Investigation, supra note 98, ¶ 94. The Chamber notes that “This 
alternative is clear from the text of Article 7(1) of the Statute, which clearly states “widespread or 
systematic”. Id. at n.91. 
 134. Id. For this proposition, the Chamber looks to ICTY precedent. See, e.g., ICTY, Prosecutor v. 
Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Appeal Judgement, 17 December 2004, paragraph 94; 
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Deronjic, Case No. IT-02-61-A, Judgement on Sentencing Appeal, 20 July 2005 
¶ 109; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeal Judgment, 29 July 2004, ¶ 101; 
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al. Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Appeal Judgement, 12 June 
2002, ¶ 96. Id. at n.93. 
 135. Id. ¶ 95. The Chamber looks to ICTY and PTC precedent in defining “widespread.” See, e.g., 
Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the 
Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, ¶ 83; Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Decision on the Prosecution Application under Article 58(7) of the Statute, 27 April 2007, 
ICC-02/05-01/07-01-Corr, ¶ 62. See also ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-
14/2-A, Appeal Judgement, 17 December 2004,¶ 94; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-
A, Appeal Judgment, 29 July 2004 , ¶ 101; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al. Case No. IT-96-23 & 
IT-96-23/1-A, Appeal Judgement, 12 June 2002, ¶ 94. Id. at n.95. 
 136. Id. ¶ 96. The PTC looks to precedent set forth by the ICTY as well as the PTC. See, e.g., 
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blagojevic and Jokic, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgement, 17 January 2005, ¶ 545. 
See also Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on 
the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05- 01/08-424, ¶ 83, ICTY, 
Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement, 3 March 2000, ¶ 206; ICTY, Prosecutor v. 
Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Appeal Judgement, 17 December 2004, para. 94; ICTY, 
Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95 14-A, Appeal Judgment, 29 July 2004 , ¶ 101. Id. at n.96. 
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[viii] the implication of high-level political and/or military 
authorities.
137
  
Lastly, as part of the crimes against humanity assessment, the PTC 
addresses the fourth element of “nexus between the individual acts and the 
attack.” The Chamber notes that “[i]n determining whether an act . . . 
forms part of an attack, the Chamber must consider the nature, aims and 
consequences of such act. Isolated acts which clearly differ, in their nature, 
aims and consequences, from other acts forming part of an attack, would 
fall outside the scope.”138  
D. Application of Relevant Law to the Situation in Kenya 
The Chamber, in its authorization decision, next turned its attention to 
applying the law to the situation in Kenya. The PTC assessed the Kenyan 
situation with respect to the four elements set forth above concerning 
crimes against humanity and the three elements, also set forth above, listed 
in article 53 (i.e., the elements addressing the standard of “reasonable basis 
to proceed” with an investigation). 
E. Crimes against Humanity in Accordance with Articles 7 and 53(1)(a) 
Concerning the evaluation of the element of “an attack directed against 
any civilian population,” the Chamber divides the nature of the attacks 
into three separate categories because the violence occurred during a 
substantial number of incidents.
139
 The first category consists of attacks 
started by the ODM and targeted against PNU supporters.
140
 The second 
comprises retaliatory attacks by groups targeted by the initial attacks and 
directed towards groups believed responsible for the initial attacks.
141
 
Within the third category, the evidence suggests that a substantial amount 
“of violent acts were committed by police.”142 For example, between June 
 
 
 137. PTC Authorization of Investigation, supra note 98, ¶ 96 & nn.99 & 100 (citing Prosecutor v. 
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998, ¶ 580. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blaskic, 
Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement, 3 March 2000, ¶ 203). 
 138. Id.¶ 98 (citing Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the 
Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-
424, ¶ 86; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Kalelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Judgement, 1 December 2003, 
¶ 866; Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgement, 15 May 2003, ¶ 326; ICTY, 
Simic, Tadic and Zaric, Case No. IT-95-9-T, Judgement, 17 October 2003, ¶ 41). Id. at nn.103 & 104. 
 139.  PTC Authorization of Investigation, supra note 98, ¶ 103. 
 140. Id. ¶ 104. 
 141. Id. ¶ 105. 
 142. Id. ¶ 106. 
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and October 2007, the police executed at least five hundred members of 
the Mugiki gang.
143
 In addition, between December 2007 and February 
2008, police allegedly employed excessive force, collaborated with 
attackers, and intentionally failed to take certain actions.
144
 Upon review 
of the nature of the attacks the Chamber concludes that: 
The available information indicates that the civilian population was 
the primary target of the attacks. Indeed, with regard to the initial 
and retaliatory attacks, it is reported that the attackers targeted 
business premises and residential areas of various villages, burnt 
down entire houses, as well as places where people sought refuge. 
Targets of police violence allegedly included unarmed women, 
elderly persons, children and teachers.
145
  
Additionally, the Chamber notes that “the attacks were directed against 
members of specifically identified communities. These communities were 
targeted on behalf of their ethnicity which was, in turn, associated with the 
support of one of the two major political parties, PNU and ODM.”146 
Moreover, attackers specifically identified ethnic groups to target; for 
example, the attackers in Nairobi and Naivasha went “door-to-door . . . in 
order to single out . . . the Luo community and other non-Kikuyus.”147  
Next, the Chamber examines the second element of crimes against 
humanity, which is the requirement of “state and organizational policy.” 
The PTC first concludes “the violence was not a mere accumulation of 
spontaneous or isolated acts. Rather, a number of the attacks were planned, 
directed or organized by various groups including local leaders, 
businessmen and politicians associated with the two leading political 
parties (PNU and ODM), as well as by members of the police force.”148 
The evidence suggests that planning and policy formation took place in the 
initial attacks against the Kikuyu community, which included meetings 
between business and political leaders and young people. As part of these 
meetings the youth were “given instructions, supplied with weapons, and 
 
 
 143. Id. (citing HRW Report, ICC-01/09-3-Anx3, at 48) 
 144. Id. 
 145. See id. ¶ 109. 
 146. Id. ¶ 110. Reports show that initially the violence was directed to mostly Kikuyu, Kisii and 
Luyha communities who were perceived to be in support of the PNU. In the retaliatory phase the 
attacks were targeting members of Kalenjin, Luo and Luhya communities which were seen to be 
affiliated with the ODM. Id. ¶¶ 111–112. 
 147. Id. ¶ 113. 
 148. Id. ¶ 117.  
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[given] money.”149 Additionally, politicians used the media to articulate 
their plans of violence against certain ethnic groups, such as the Kikuyu 
community.
150
 The evidence supports a clear sense of organized plans and 
policies that are “coordinated and organized.”151 
The Chamber then looks to the third element of the crimes against 
humanity assessment, which addresses the “widespread nature of the 
attacks.” The Chamber determines that “the available information 
substantiates the Prosecutor’s submission that a large number of civilians 
were victimized in the course of the attacks.”152 The Chamber states, “for 
the period between 27 December 2007 and 28 February 2008, it is 
reported that 1,133 to 1,220 people were killed, about 3,561 people injured 
and up to approximately 350,000 persons displaced.”153 Moreover, the 
PTC discusses that approximately 400 of the deaths that occurred resulted 
from police shootings.
154
 The PTC concludes that the attacks were 
widespread. 
Lastly, the Chamber evaluates the fourth element of the “nexus 
between the individual acts and the attacks,” which it finds satisfied. The 
PTC assesses the situation in Kenya as follows: “[T]he Chamber observes 
that the nature, aims and consequences of many of the individual acts 
recall either the characteristics of the initial attacks, the retaliatory attacks 
or the attacks emanating from the police.”155 For example, in the initial 
attacks, significant groups of youths attacked Kikuyu communities and 
 
 
 149. Id. ¶ 119. Training and the taking of oaths apparently took place at private residences or 
camps prior to instances of violence. Id. 
 150. Id. ¶ 120.  
 151. Id. ¶ 121. The specific evidence mentioned by the Chamber is as follows:  
In some instances, attacks were carried out by large groups of raiders which arrived from 
different directions outside of the scene of the attack, carried out simultaneous attacks or 
fought in different shifts. Some groups of attackers showed visible signs of internal cohesion 
consisting of some form of uniform or face painting. ... The supporting material also 
highlights phenomena such as the large supply of petrol and the use of sophisticated 
weaponry. Such phenomena are consistent with allegations that businessmen or politicians 
financed the violence or directly supplied vehicles, petrol or weapons which were to be used 
in the attacks.  
Id. ¶¶ 121–122. The Chamber also mentions that with regard to the retaliatory attacks involving 
violence against non-Kikuyu groups, similar planning and organization took place, such as “meetings 
organized by politicians, local businessmen and local leaders where attacks against communities 
associated with the ODM were reportedly discussed.” Id. ¶ 124. Additionally, politicians reportedly 
used hate speech and religious leaders sent out ethnic propaganda against non-Kikuyu communities. 
The media also participated in distributing this propaganda. Id. ¶ 125. 
 152. Id. ¶ 130. 
 153. Id. ¶ 131. 
 154. Id. ¶ 134. This number is for the period between December 27, 2007 and February 28, 2008. 
Id. 
 155. Id. ¶ 135. 
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burnt down their houses, ostensibly in order to expel them from their 
communities. These actions resulted in “massive displacement.”156 In the 
retaliatory attacks youths attacked members of the Kalenjin and Luo 
communities with weapons, resulting in further displacement and 
expulsion of the non-Kikuyu communities.
157
 
Within the assessment of crimes against humanity the Chamber 
examines the “underlying acts constituting crimes against humanity” 
which implicates the rationae materiae requirement. The PTC 
acknowledges that at the early phase of the proceedings it is impossible to 
assess the mens rea; therefore, the Chamber examines only the actus rea 
of the specific crimes committed.
158
 The first of the analyzed crimes is 
“murder constituting a crime against humanity under article 7(1)(a) of the 
Statute.”159 The Chamber finds that “the Prosecutor’s submission that 
murder occurred is substantiated by the available information.”160 Next, 
the PTC addresses “rape and other forms of sexual violence constituting a 
crime against humanity under article 7(1)(g) of the Statute.”161 The 
Chamber determines that “The Prosecutor alleges that ‘numerous incidents 
of sexual violence including rape of men and women took place. The 
Chamber observes that the available information substantiates the 
foregoing allegation.”162  
The PTC subsequently addresses the issue of “forcible transfer of 
population constituting a crime against humanity under article 7(1)(d) of 
the Statute.”163 The Chamber recognizes that “[t]he supporting material 
reveals further that the displacements did not take place on a voluntary 
 
 
 156. Id. ¶ 136. 
 157. Id. ¶ 137. Luo men were also “forcibly circumcised.” Id. 
 158. Id. ¶ 140.  
 159. Id. at 57.  
 160. Id. ¶ 143. See also ¶¶ 144–150. Examples of the murders are as follows: within December 
2007 and February 2008 it has been reported that 98 people were killed in Western province. In 
Nyanza, 134 deaths occurred; in Nairobi province, 125 deaths; in Central province, “up to 
approximately 15 people were killed[;]” and in Coast province, “at least 27 deaths.” See id. ¶¶ 146–
150. 
 161. Id. at 60. 
 162. Id. ¶¶ 152–153. Specific evidence supporting this determination is as follows:  
[I]n the period between 27 December 2007 and 29 February 2008, the Nairobi Women’s 
Hospital’s Gender Violence Recovery Centre treated 443 survivors of sexual and gender 
based violence, 80 percent of which were rape or defilement cases. . . [T]he Chamber notes 
the high number of reported gang rapes, including rapes by a group of over 20 men, and the 
brutality, characterized in particular by the cutting of the victims. . . 
Id. ¶ 154. Additionally, the Chamber acknowledges that instances of sexual violence were at times 
based on ethnicity and targeted certain such groups, and that many acts of sexual violence were 
committed by police. Id. ¶ 155. 
 163. Id. at 62.  
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basis, and were forced. People were displaced either as a result of violence 
or as a consequence of threats of violence.”164 Lastly, the PTC evaluates 
“other inhumane acts causing serious injury constituting a crime against 
humanity under article 7(1)(k) of the Statute.”165 The Chamber recalls 
“that to establish that other inhumane acts have been committed, it must be 
satisfied that ‘a perpetrator inflicted great suffering, or serious injury to 
body or to mental or physical health, by means of an inhumane act.’”166 
Furthermore, the Chamber “finds that the available information 
substantiates the Prosecutor’s submission with regard to the occurrence of 
other inhumane acts.”167 
After addressing the “underlying acts constituting crimes against 
humanity” the Chamber evaluates the jurisdictional requirements, 
including ratione temporis and ratione loci. In this respect the Chamber 
“concurs with the Prosecutor that the crimes allegedly committed after 1 
June 2005 [the date Kenya ratified the Rome Statute] . . . fall within the 
jurisdiction ratione temporis of the Court.”168 The Chamber then evaluates 
ratione loci and finds that “the alleged crimes against humanity occurred 
on the territory of the Republic of Kenya, for which reason the Court’s 
jurisdiction ratione loci . . . is satisfied.”169 
F. Article 53(1)(b) and Article 17 “Admissibility” Determinations 
(Complementarity and Gravity)  
Significantly, the PTC, in its authorization decision, finds that “the case 
would be admissible under article 17 of the Statute.”170 The Chamber 
 
 
 164. Id. ¶ 162. Evidence to support this finding includes:  
IDPs [Internally Displaced Persons] were forcefully evicted through direct physical violence 
against them, the burning of their houses and the destruction of their property. Most IDPs left 
their homes in panic, under emergency conditions, often under direct attack from gangs of 
armed youth. Sexual violence was another means to forcibly evict women and their families 
from particular communities. 
Id. ¶ 164. In addition, the Chamber noted “the available information does not include any contentions 
to the effect that the targeted communities were not lawfully present in the area from which they were 
transferred or that such transfer could have been justified by grounds permitted under international 
law.” Id. ¶ 165. 
 165. Id. at 65. 
 166. Id. ¶ 166 (citing Elements of Crimes, Article 7(1)(k)(1)). 
 167. Id. ¶ 168. Supporting evidence here includes the following: “at least 3,561 persons suffered 
injuries as a result of the violence associated with the 2007 presidential elections.” Id. ¶ 169. The PTC 
also relied upon acts of violence including “various instances of cutting and hacking, including 
amputations.” Id. ¶ 170. 
 168. Id. ¶ 174.  
 169. Id. ¶ 178. 
 170. Id. ¶ 181. 
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emphasizes that at the current point in the proceedings the admissibility 
evaluation refers to the admissibility of one or more potential cases within 
the context of a “situation”.  
The parameters of a potential case have been defined by the 
Chamber as comprising two main elements: (i) the groups of 
persons involved that are likely to be the object of an investigation 
for the purpose of shaping the future case(s); and (ii) the crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court allegedly committed during the 
incidents that are likely to be the focus of an investigation for the 
purpose of shaping the future case(s).
171
 
In addition to the review of potential cases, under the complementarity 
provision the PTC must determine if “Republic of Kenya or any third 
State is conducting or has conducted national proceedings in relation to 
these elements which are likely to constitute the Court’s future case(s).”172 
Initially, in Kenya, there were indications that Kenyan officials wanted to 
proceed with forming a special tribunal to address the post-election 
violence; however, a bill to enact such a tribunal had not been passed by 
the Kenyan Parliament.
173
 In addition, there have been no domestic 
prosecutions for crimes against humanity or of those individuals who bear 
the most responsibility.
174
 Instead, there have been proceedings for lesser 
offences conducted on a small scale.
175
 The potential cases to arise from 
the OTP’s investigation would be admissible under the complementarity 
provision:
176
 
In this regard, the Chamber’s review of the available information 
does not contravene the Prosecutor’s conclusion that there is a lack 
of national proceedings in the Republic of Kenya or in any third 
State with respect to the main elements which may shape the 
Court’s potential case(s). Yet, there are references to a number of 
domestic investigations and prosecutions concerning the post-
election period, but only in relation to minor offences. In particular, 
 
 
 171. Id. ¶ 182. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. ¶ 183. 
 174. Id. Indeed, there was an absence of any attempts at domestic prosecutions for these crimes. 
Id. 
 175. Id. The “lesser offenses” for which there apparently have been criminal proceedings in 
Kenya include “malicious damage, theft, house breaking, possession of an offensive weapon, and 
robbery with violence.” Id. Clearly, these criminal acts do not rise to the level of crimes against 
humanity.  
 176. Id. ¶¶ 181, 183. 
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the February 2009 report submitted to the Kenyan Attorney General 
concerning cases in Western, Nyanza, Central, Rift Valley, Eastern, 
Coast and Nairobi provinces reveals that national investigations and 
prosecutions were directed against persons that fall outside the 
category of those who bear the greatest responsibility. . . . 
Moreover, attempts to establish a special tribunal to prosecute those 
who are responsible for the post-election violence were frustrated, 
which serves as a further indication of inactivity on the part of the 
Kenyan authorities to address the potential responsibility of those 
who are likely to be the focus of the Court’s investigation.177 
The Chamber then concludes “in the absence of national investigations in 
relation to: (i) the senior business and political leaders associated with the 
ODM and PNU . . . ; and (ii) the crimes against humanity allegedly 
committed in the context of the most serious criminal incidents . . . , the 
case would be admissible under [the complementarity principle].”178 
Following its analysis of the complementarity requirement, the PTC 
examines the gravity component of admissibility. In particular, the PTC 
examines:  
(i) whether the persons or groups of persons that are likely to be the 
object of an investigation include those who may bear the greatest 
responsibility for the alleged crimes committed; and (ii) the gravity 
of the crimes allegedly committed within the incidents, which are 
likely to be the object of an investigation. In relation to the latter, 
the Chamber stated earlier that it is guided by factors such as the 
scale, nature, manner of commission, impact of crimes committed 
on victims and the existence of aggravating circumstances.
179
 
After assessing the situation in Kenya with respect to the gravity 
requirement, the Chamber finds that: “the Prosecutor’s submission 
concerning the scale of the post-election violence appears substantiated. 
This finding is justified on the basis of the alleged number of deaths, 
documented rapes, displaced persons, and acts of injury, as well as the 
geographical location of these crimes, which appears widespread.”180 The 
Chamber also mentions the brutality of the attacks within the context of its 
evaluation of gravity: 
 
 
 177. Id. ¶ 185 (italics supplied). 
 178. Id. ¶ 187. 
 179. Id. ¶ 188. 
 180. Id. ¶ 191. 
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The Chamber is of the view that the Prosecutor’s submission 
concerning the element of brutality is pertinent to the means used to 
execute the violence. The supporting material corroborates the 
Prosecutor’s contention insofar as it reveals many instances of 
cutting and hacking, including amputations, and reports of forced 
circumcision and genital amputation inflicted upon members of the 
Luo community. The supporting material further indicates that rapes 
were often characterized by a degree of brutality, including high 
numbers of reported gang rapes, including by a group of over 20 
men, and the cutting of the victims or the insertion of crude weapon 
and other objects in the vagina.
181
  
After reviewing these general gravity considerations, the Chamber turns to 
gravity in relation to “potential cases.” The PTC addresses the first 
element of the gravity analysis by noting that with regard to “the groups of 
persons likely to be the focus of the Prosecutor’s future investigations, the 
supporting material refers to their high-ranking positions, and their alleged 
role in the violence, namely inciting, planning, financing, colluding with 
criminal gangs, and otherwise contributing to the organization of the 
violence. This renders the first constituent element of gravity satisfied.”182 
Next, the Chamber examines the second element, and finds that it is also 
satisfied: “[C]oncerning the crimes allegedly committed within the 
incidents that are likely to be the object of the Prosecutor’s investigations 
[i.e., the second element], the Chamber considers that some of the specific 
crimes committed in the context of the potential incidents suggested by the 
Prosecutor satisfy the element of scale.”183 Thus, according to the PTC, the 
overall test of gravity has been met.
184
 
G. Scope of Investigation 
Upon its approval of the OTP’s request to initiate an investigation 
proprio motu pursuant to Article 15 of the Statute, the PTC carefully 
outlined the parameters for the investigation. For example, regarding 
temporal limitations on the investigation,  
 
 
 181. Id. ¶ 193. 
 182. Id. ¶ 198. 
 183. Id. ¶¶ 199–200. Regarding scale, the Court noted that the crimes include “burned houses, 
deaths, and displaced people, which resulted from the violence. Some of the crimes which occurred in 
the context of the proposed incidents were marked by elements of brutality, for example burning 
victims alive, attacking places sheltering IDPs, beheadings, and using pangas and machetes to hack 
people to death.” Id. ¶ 199. 
 184. Id. ¶ 200. 
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[T]he Chamber consider[ed] it appropriate to define the temporal 
scope of the authorized investigation of the events that took place as 
between . . . the date of the Statute’s entry into force for the 
Republic of Kenya . . . and . . . the date of the filing of the 
Prosecutor’s Request . . ., since this was the last opportunity for the 
Prosecutor to assess the information available to him prior to its 
submission to the Chamber’s examination.185  
In addition, the PTC emphasized its active, supervisory role over the 
“material” scope of the investigation:  
[F]or the material parameters of the authorization with respect to the 
investigation in Kenya, the Chamber recalls that the purpose of the 
proceedings under article 15 of the Statute is to provide it with a 
supervisory role over the Prosecutor’s proprio motu initiative to 
proceed with an investigation. The Chamber is of the view that, 
allowing the Prosecutor, by way of the present authorization, to 
investigate acts constituting crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court other than crimes against humanity (i.e., the alleged crimes 
referred to in the Prosecutor’s Request and in the supporting 
material and, as such, the only material subject-matter of the present 
decision), would not be consistent with the specific purpose of the 
provision of article 15 of the Statute to subject the Prosecutor’s 
proprio motu initiative to commence an investigation to the review 
of the Chamber. By the same token, to leave open the material 
scope of the authorization would deprive of its meaning the 
examination of the Prosecutor’s Request and supporting material 
conducted by the Chamber for the purposes of its decision to 
authorize or not the commencement of an investigation initiated 
proprio motu by the Prosecutor.  
For this reason, the Chamber is of the view that the authorization 
granted to the Prosecutor pursuant to article 15 of the Statute shall 
encompass the investigation into the situation in Kenya in relation 
to the alleged commission of crimes against humanity.
186
 
Additionally, a point that should also be noted is the dissenting opinion of 
one of the PTC judges in deciding to grant the Prosecutor’s request. The 
dissent of the judge was based on the fact that the crimes committed in 
 
 
 185. Id. ¶ 207. 
 186. Id. ¶¶ 208–209 (italics supplied). Finally, the PTC restricted geographically the investigation 
by the OTP to the “territory of the Republic of Kenya.” Id. ¶ 211. 
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Kenya did not meet the threshold of crimes against humanity.
187
 The 
source of the dissent lies within the legal definition of “attack directed 
against any civilian population” and whether those crimes were committed 
“pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit 
such [an] attack.”188 The judge concluded that the crimes outlined in the 
Prosecutor’s request did not fall within the jurisdictional mandate of the 
ICC (i.e., they did not constitute “crimes against humanity”).189 The 
reasoning behind the judge’s dissent was that “crimes against humanity” 
may only be committed by permanent or semi-permanent state-like 
organizations or states themselves.
190
 He argued that the groupings of local 
leaders that perpetrated the violence were not sufficiently organized (for 
example, in terms of “structure, membership, duration and means to attack 
the civilian population.”)191  
V. KENYA’S ADMISSIBILITY CHALLENGE UNDER THE COMPLEMENTARITY 
PRINCIPLE AND THE ICC RESPONSE 
The Kenyan government did not support the ICC’s intervention in the 
post-election violence inquiry because it perceived it as an incursion into 
its sovereignty. In particular, in a key filing before the ICC, the Kenyan 
government sought to establish the case against the suspects as 
inadmissible under the complementarity principle.
192
 For example, in its 
 
 
 187. PTC Authorization of Investigation, supra note 98, at app. ¶ 4 (Kaul, J. dissenting). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. ¶ ¶ 40, 51, 60. 
 191. Id. ¶ 150.  
In sum, I have not found any information in the supporting material, including the victims’ 
representation, suggesting that a State policy existed pursuant to which the civilian population 
was attacked. In total, the overall picture is characterized by chaos, anarchy, a collapse of 
State authority in most parts of the country and almost total failure of law enforcement 
agencies. 
Id. ¶¶ 152–153. 
 192. See generally Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Application on Behalf of the 
Government of the Republic of Kenya Pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute (Mar. 31, 2011), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1050005.pdf [hereinafter Kenya Application]. See also id. ¶¶ 5–
6, 80. Article 19 deals with challenges by states to the admissibility of a case before the ICC, including 
admissibility challenges implicating the complementarity principle. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, 
art. 19 (2)(b). Kenya requested that the Pre-Trial Chamber determine that the cases involving its six 
nationals were inadmissible less than a month after the summonses were issued. The PTC issued 
summonses to the “Ocampo Six” (i.e., the six individuals associated with the then current Kenyan 
coalition government—Francis Kirimi Muthaura, William Samoei Ruto, Mohammed Hussein Ali, 
Henry Kiprono Kosgey, Joshua Arap Sang, and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta). See Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case 
No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Summons to Appear for William 
Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey, and Joshua Arap Sang (Mar. 8, 2011), available at 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss4/7
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filing, the Kenyan government cited judicial and constitutional reforms 
such as the drafting of a new constitution, which included strengthened 
trial rights and revamped national courts now able to try “crimes from the 
post-election violence, including the ICC cases . . .”193 Kenya also cited its 
efforts to investigate and prosecute a number of lower-level perpetrators in 
the post-election violence.
194
 Moreover, Kenya emphasized that with the 
passage of the legislative International Crimes Act of 2008, Kenyan courts 
“have jurisdiction to prosecute all of the crimes included in the [Rome] 
Statute.”195 According to Kenya, it would appoint judges to the appropriate 
appellate court capable of dealing with post-election cases by a certain 
date, and it would continue to carry out investigations for those cases (and 
corresponding crimes).
196
  
 
 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1037044.pdf. See also Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Case No. ICC-
01/09-02/11, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Summonses to Appear for Francis Kirimi 
Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, and Mohammed Hussein Ali (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1037052.pdf. 
 193. See Kenya Application, supra note 192, ¶¶ 2, 48 (explaining new Kenyan Bill of Rights). 
Kenya stated in its Article 19 filing that its judicial reforms would be completed by September, 2011. 
Id. ¶ 40. Another important point stressed by Kenya is the fact that the new Constitution makes the 
judiciary independent and “establishes a Supreme Court for the first time in Kenya’s history which is 
the supreme judicial organ for the interpretation and protection of the Constitution (Article 163).” Id. 
¶ 50. The Constitution also establishes a new, independent position of Director of Public Prosecutions 
to “guarantee independence of investigations and prosecutions at all levels.” Id. ¶ 67. Moreover, 
Kenya highlights in its Article 19 application a vetting process for judges that is “competitive, open 
and transparent.” Id. ¶ 53. Finally, Kenya posits that under the new Constitution there can be no 
official immunities from prosecution. See id. ¶ 59.  
 194. Id. ¶¶ 34,71. 
 195. Id. ¶ 57. 
 196. The date was the end of July 2011. Id. ¶¶ 61, 66, 70. The Article 19 application also explains 
recent police reforms. Id. ¶¶ 75–77. In addition, efforts have been made regarding the issue of witness 
protection. Id. ¶ 78. Finally, in a subsequent document submitted by Kenya following its application, 
Kenya asserted that “‘any argument that there must be an identity of individuals as well as of subject 
matter being investigated by a State and by the Prosecutor of the ICC is necessarily false as the State 
may simply not have evidence available to the Prosecutor of the ICC or may even be deprived of such 
evidence.’” See Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Judgment on the Appeal of the 
Republic of Kenya against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 Entitled “Decision on 
the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to 
Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute,” ¶ 28, (Aug. 30, 2011) http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ 
doc1223118.pdf (citing Kenya’s Reply of May 16, 2011, ¶ 27). Kenya argued that “‘there is simply no 
guarantee that an identical cohort of individuals will fall for investigation by the State seeking to 
exclude ICC admissibility as by the Prosecutor seeking to establish it.’” Id. (citing Kenya’s Reply of 
May 16, 2011, ¶ 27). As to Kenya’s argument that a state may not have available to it the same 
evidence as the ICC Prosecutor, the Appeals Chamber concluded that this argument is not 
“persuasive” because “if a State does not investigate a given suspect because of lack of evidence, then 
there is simply no conflict of jurisdictions, and no reason why the case should be inadmissible before 
the Court . . . [W]hat is relevant for the admissibility of a concrete case under [the complementarity] 
principle of the Statute is not whether the same evidence in the Prosecutor’s possession is available to 
a State, but whether the State is carrying out steps directed at ascertaining whether these suspects are 
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Kenya’s request of the Pre-Trial Chamber to find the cases against the 
defendants inadmissible under the complementarity principle was denied, 
and the cases ruled admissible.
197
 The PTC found that “there are no 
concrete steps showing ongoing investigations against the three suspects in 
the present case.”198 The PTC concluded that because of the “situation of 
[judicial] inactivity [against the particular suspects,] . . . the Chamber 
[could not] but determine that the case is admissible.”199 Kenya appealed 
the decision; however, the Appeals Chamber agreed with the PTC, ruling 
that a state merely providing evidence of “ongoing investigations” would 
not suffice to dismiss an ICC investigation. On the contrary, to 
 
 
responsible for substantially the same conduct as is the subject of the proceedings before the Court.” 
Id. ¶ 43.  
 197. See generally Prosecutor v. Ruto, Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya 
Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute (May 30, 2011), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1078822.pdf [hereinafter Article 19 Decision]. See also 
Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the 
Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute (May 30, 2011), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1078823.pdf. These two decisions challenging admissibility based on the 
complementarity principle (i.e., the appeal of Ruto, Kosgey and Sang, on the one hand, and that of 
Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali, on the other hand), although appearing in separate documents, reach the 
same essential findings and holdings. See also Thomas O. Hansen, A Critical Review of the ICC’s 
Recent Practice Concerning Inadmissibility Challenges and Complementarity, 13 MELBOURNE J. 
INTL. L. 217, 221 (2012). Up until the time of these admissibility decisions in the Kenya case, the ICC 
had used a “two-fold” test to evaluate the complementarity issue. See id. at 221. The two-fold test 
entails: 
considering whether a case is inadmissible under article 17(1)(a) and (b) of the Statute . . . 
[T]he initial questions to ask are (1) whether there are ongoing investigations or prosecutions, 
or (2) whether there have been investigations in the past, and the State having jurisdiction has 
decided not to prosecute the person concerned. It is only when the answers to these questions 
are in the affirmative that one has to look to the second halves of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) 
and to examine the question of unwillingness and inability. To do otherwise would be to put 
the cart before the horse. It follows that in case of inaction, the question of unwillingness or 
inability does not arise; inaction on the part of a State having jurisdiction (that is, the fact that 
a State is not investigating or prosecuting, or has not done so) renders a case admissible 
before the Court, subject to article 17(1) (d) of the Statute [the gravity determination].  
Id. 
 198. See Article 19 Decision, supra note 197, ¶ 60. See also id. ¶ 69 (“In particular, the chamber 
lacks information about dates when investigations, if any, have commenced against the three 
[particular] suspects, and whether the suspects were actually questioned or not and if so, the contents 
of the police or public prosecutions’ reports regarding the questioning. The Government of Kenya also 
fails to provide the Chamber with any information as to the conduct, crimes or the incidents for which 
the three [particular] suspects are being investigated or questioned for. There is equally no record that 
shows that the relevant witnesses are being or have been questioned.”). 
 199. See Article 19 Decision, supra note 197, ¶ 70. See also Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Case No. 
ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the 
Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute (May 30, 2011), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1078823.pdf. These two decisions challenging admissibility based on the 
complementarity principle (i.e., the appeal of Ruto, Kosgey and Sang, on the one hand, and that of 
Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali, on the other hand), although appearing in separate documents, reach the 
same essential findings and holdings. 
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successfully challenge admissibility, Kenya would have to “provide the 
Court with evidence [consisting of] . . . a sufficient degree of specificity 
and probative value that demonstrates that it is indeed investigating the 
case.”200 
The Appeals Chamber of the ICC ultimately rejected the challenges 
brought by Kenya under the complementarity principle.
201
 These 
challenges constitute the first time that a state party has sought to have a 
case deemed inadmissible before the ICC on complementarity grounds.
202
 
The appeal essentially argued that the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision 
 
 
 200. See Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, “Judgment on the appeal of the Republic 
of Kenya against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled “Decision on the 
Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to 
Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute” (Aug. 30 2011), ¶ 2 [hereinafter Article 19 Appeal], available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1223118.pdf (last visited July 29, 2013). 
 201. See generally id. See also Prosecutor v. Muthaura, No. ICC-01/09-02/11-274, “Judgment on 
the Appeal of the Republic of Kenya Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 
Entitled “Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of 
the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute” (Aug. 30, 2011), at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1223134.pdf (reaching the same basic findings and holdings as the Appeals 
Chamber in the Ruto, Kosgey and Sang case). In both appeals (i.e., the Ruto, Kosgey and Sang appeal, 
and the Muthaura, Kenyatta, and Ali appeal), the judgment was a 4–1 decision by the ICC. The dissent 
was by Judge Anita Ušacka. Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Judgment on the Appeal 
of the Republic of Kenya Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 Entitled 
“Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case 
Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute” (Sept. 20, 2011) (Ušacka, J., dissenting), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1234872.pdf. Article 19(2)(b) allows a state to challenge the admissibility of a 
case before the ICC based, inter alia, on article 17, the complementarity principle. It reads, in pertinent 
part, that “[c]hallenges to the admissibility of a case on the grounds referred to in article 17 . . . may be 
made by: . . . [b] A State which has jurisdiction over a case, on the ground that it is investigating or 
prosecuting the case or has investigated or prosecuted.” See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 19(2)(b).  
 202. See Charles Chernor Jalloh, International Decision, Situation in the Republic of Kenya. No. 
ICC-01/09-02/11-274: Judgment on Kenya’s Appeal of Decision Denying Admissibility, 106 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 118 (2011) [hereinafter Situation in the Republic of Kenya]. Libya followed suit in 2012. See 
Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Application on Behalf of the Government of Libya 
Pursuant to Article 19 of the Statute (May 1, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ Application on 
behalf of the Government of Libya pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute.pdf. Kenya’s appeal on 
the decision made on their Article 19 challenged was cited or referred to numerous times in Libya’s 
application. See id. ¶¶ 70, 82, 86, 88, 92. Jalloh noted that there are two competing views on the issue 
of complementarity as reflected in the Appeals Chamber’s ruling in the Kenya case. First, there is the 
view espoused by the Kenyan government that “national jurisdictions should win by default [in the 
absence of] strong evidence rebutting the presumption in favor of their right to prosecute first.” See 
Jalloh, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, supra at 121. The second view, espoused by the Court, is 
that “the primary goal of the Rome Statute is to end impunity, and that whatever division of labor 
accomplishes that end will, or rather should, win out.” See id. Jalloh asserts that “[t]he government 
[Kenya] and the dissent [by Judge Anita UŠACKA in the admissibility decision in the Appeals 
Chamber] correctly observed that the ICC was intended to complement the work of national 
jurisdictions when states exercise their primary duty to investigate and prosecute international crimes--
a matter that, not coincidentally, also goes to the heart of state sovereignty.” Id.  
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should be reversed because it was based on “factual, procedural and legal 
errors.”203  
The Kenyan government, in its appeal, sought a decision that favored 
deference to state jurisdiction under the Article 17 complementarity 
provisions.
 
For example, Kenya argued that “the case is being 
investigated” language in Article 17(1)(a) did not mean, as the PTC had 
earlier determined, that “for a case to be inadmissible before the Court, a 
national jurisdiction must be investigating the same person and for the 
same conduct as in the case already before the Court.”204 That rather 
demanding test requires, for a case to be deemed inadmissible before the 
Court, that a criminal investigation at the national level encompass both 
the same conduct and the same person that are involved in the case before 
the Court.
205
 Instead, Kenya claimed, the test should be whether the 
national proceedings “cover the same conduct in respect of persons at the 
same level in the hierarchy being investigated by the ICC.”206 Kenya thus 
envisioned that the complementarity principle of Article 17 carries a 
“presumption in favour of national jurisdictions” and “leaway [sic] in the 
exercise of discretion in the application of the principle of 
complementarity.”207 
In Kenya’s appeal of the PTC’s admissibility decision implicating the 
Article 17 complementarity provision, the Appeals Chamber ruled 
squarely on the “same-person, same-conduct” test.208 The majority 
 
 
 203. Article 19 Appeal, supra note 200, ¶ 13. 
 204. Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11-274, Judgment on the Appeal of the 
Republic of Kenya Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 Entitled “Decision 
on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to 
Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute” (Aug. 30, 2011), ¶ 26, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/ 
doc/doc1223134.pdf.  
 205. Id. ¶¶ 27, 39. 
 206. Id. ¶ 27. 
 207. See id. ¶ 29. The Appeals Chamber rejected Kenya’s argument for “leaway” in the following 
way:  
This argument has no merit because . . . the purpose of the admissibility proceedings under 
Article 19 of the Statute [e.g., admissibility challenges based on complementarity] is to 
determine whether the case brought by the Prosecutor is inadmissible because of a 
jurisdictional conflict. Unless there is such a conflict, the case is admissible. The suggestion 
that there should be a presumption in favor of domestic jurisdictions does not contradict this 
conclusion. 
Id. ¶ 43. See generally Jalloh, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, supra note 202. 
 208. Pre-Trial Chamber I had originally formulated this test in the case involving the Situation in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision 
Concerning Pre-Trial Chamber I’s Decision of 10 February 2006 and the Incorporation of Documents 
into the Record of the Case Against Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ¶¶ 31, 34, 37 (Feb. 10, 2006), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc236260.PDF. See also Jalloh, Situation in the Republic of 
Kenya, supra note 202, at n.8. 
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essentially adopted this test as the principal tool with which to evaluate the 
complementarity issue, concluding that “the national investigation must 
cover the same individual and substantially the same conduct as alleged in 
the proceedings before the Court.”209 For the Court, the language of 
Article 17 and the context of the particular case (i.e., at or after a warrant 
or summons has been issued by the Court, or after charges have been filed 
by the Prosecutor and confirmed by the PTC) provide the rationale for 
adoption of the more specific and demanding “same-person, substantially 
the same-conduct” test.210 In particular, in the Kenya case, because a 
 
 
 209. Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11-274, Judgment on the Appeal of the 
Republic of Kenya Against the Decision of Pre-trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 Entitled “Decision on 
the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to 
Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute” (Aug. 30, 2011), ¶ 39, http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ 
doc1223134.pdf. In the Libya case, the PTC recently elaborated on the meaning of “substantially the 
same conduct”:  
Therefore, in the circumstances of the case at hand and bearing in mind the purpose of the 
complementarity principle, the Chamber considers that it would not be appropriate to expect 
Libya’s investigation to cover exactly the same acts of murder and persecution mentioned in 
the [ICC’s] Article 58 [Warrant] Decision as constituting instances of Mr Gaddafi’s alleged 
course of conduct. Instead, the Chamber will assess, on the basis of the evidence provided by 
Libya, whether the alleged domestic investigation [of Gaddafi] addresses the same conduct 
underlying the Warrant of Arrest and Article 58 Decision.  
See Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Decision on the admissibility of the Case of 
Against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1599307.pdf, ¶ 83. See id. ¶ 77 
(“The Chamber considers that the determination of what is ‘substantially the same conduct as alleged 
in the proceedings before the Court’ will vary according to the concrete facts and circumstances of the 
case and, therefore, requires a case-by-case analysis.”) See also id. ¶ 133 (The Court “does not expect 
the national investigation to the exact events that are mentioned in the Article 58 [Warrant] 
Decision.”).  
 210. Id. ¶ 36 (“Consequently, under Article 17 (1)(a), first alternative, the question is not merely a 
question of ‘investigation’ in the abstract, but is whether the same case is being investigated by both 
the Court and a national jurisdiction.”). The significance of case context is discussed in paragraphs 38 
and 39 of the Appeals decision:  
The meaning of the words ‘case is being investigated’ in article 17(1)(a) of the Statute must 
therefore be understood in the context to which it is applied. For the purpose of proceedings 
relating to the initiation of an investigation into a situation (articles 15 and 53(1) of the 
Statute), the contours of the likely cases will often be relatively vague because the 
investigations of the Prosecutor are at their initial stages. . . . Often, no individual suspects 
will have been identified at this stage, nor will the exact conduct nor its legal classification be 
clear. . . . In contrast, article 19 of the Statute relates to the admissibility of concrete cases. 
The cases are defined by the warrant of arrest or summons to appear issued under article 58, 
or the charges brought by the Prosecutor and confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber under 
article 61. [For example,] Article 58 requires that for a warrant of arrest or a summons to 
appear to be issued, there must be reasonable grounds to believe that the person named 
therein has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. . . . Thus, the defining 
elements of a concrete case before the Court are the individual and the alleged conduct. It 
follows that for such a case to be inadmissible under article 17(1)(a) of the Statute [the 
complementarity principle], the national investigation must cover the same person and 
substantially the same conduct as alleged in the proceedings before the Court. 
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summons for particular suspects for specific conduct had already been 
issued, the “context” of the case meant that this test would apply. 
“[The Kenyan] case is only inadmissible before the court if the same 
suspects are being investigated by Kenya for substantially the same 
conduct. The words ‘is being investigated’, in this context, signify the 
taking of [specific] steps directed at ascertaining whether those suspects 
are responsible for that conduct, for instance by interviewing witnesses or 
suspects, collecting documentary evidence, or carrying out forensic 
analyses.”211 
The Appeals Chamber concluded that Kenya was not actively taking 
these “specific steps”:  
[The relevant documents provided by Kenya] made reference, in a 
general manner, to alleged investigations against all the suspects in 
the case[; however,] they do not provide any details as to the steps 
Kenya may have taken to ascertain whether they were responsible 
 
 
Id. ¶¶ 38–39 (emphasis added). See also Article 19 Decision, supra note 197, ¶ 54. (“The criteria 
established by the Chamber in its . . . Authorisation Decision were not conclusive but simply indicative 
of the sort of elements that the Court should consider in making an admissibility determination within 
the context of a situation, namely when the examination is in relation to one or more ‘potential’ 
case(s). At that stage, the reference to the groups of persons is mainly to broaden the test, because at 
the preliminary stage of the investigation into the situation it is unlikely to have an identified suspect. 
The test is more specific when it comes to an admissibility determination at the ‘case’ stage, which 
starts with an application by the Prosecutor under article 58 of the Statute for the issuance of a warrant 
of arrest or summons to appear, where one or more suspects has or have been identified. At this stage, 
the case(s) before the Court are already shaped. Thus, during the “case” stage, the admissibility 
determination must be assessed against national proceedings related to those particular persons that are 
subject to the Court’s proceedings.”). Id.  
 211. Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11-274, Judgment on the Appeal of the 
Republic of Kenya Against the Decision of Pre-trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 Entitled “Decision on 
the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to 
Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute,” ¶ 40 (Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ 
doc1223134.pdf. The Appeals Chamber went on to say that: 
[T]he mere preparedness to take such steps or the investigation of other suspects is not 
sufficient. This is because unless investigative steps are actually taken in relation to the 
suspects that are the subject of the proceedings before the Court, it cannot be said that the 
same case is (currently) under investigation by the Court and by a national jurisdiction, and 
there is therefore no conflict of jurisdictions. 
Id. ¶ 40. Finally, the Court concluded that in the Kenya case:  
[T]he proceedings have progressed and that specific suspects have been identified. At this 
stage of the proceedings, where summonses to appear have been issued, the question is no 
longer whether suspects at the same hierarchical level are being investigated by Kenya, but 
whether the same suspects are the subject of investigation by both jurisdictions for 
substantially the same conduct. 
Id. ¶ 41. The Appeals Chamber later noted that “[t]he [PTC] . . . required proof that Kenya was taking 
specific steps to investigate the three suspects. The Appeals Chamber . . . [could not] identify any error 
in this approach.” Id. ¶ 61.  
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for the conduct that is alleged against them in the proceedings 
before the Court. . . . The only suspect specifically named in [the 
relevant documents] is Mr Ruto. . . However, even this information 
falls short of substantiating what has been done to investigate him 
for that conduct.
212
 
VI. THE DEFENDANTS, THE SUMMONSES, AND THE CHARGES 
The Kenyan defendants were charged with crimes against humanity. 
Crimes against humanity require that the acts prosecuted be “part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against . . . [a] civilian 
population,” and that the perpetrator know about the overall attack.213 The 
most recent list of acts constituting crimes against humanity in the Rome 
Statute includes: 
 
 
 212. Id. ¶ 67. Jalloh argues that: 
The majority’s interpretation [in the Kenya admissibility decision by the Appeals Chamber] 
rests on a broader, more interventionist, and perhaps unrealistic vision of the ICC. In this 
view, the crimes over which the Court has jurisdiction are international in nature and since the 
ICC was created to help end the culture of impunity for them, the application of 
complementarity should not become too restrictive. Otherwise, the international penal court 
will lose its limited leverage over national jurisdictions and become unable to fulfill this 
broader noble mission. This conception, too, is supported by the preamble to the Rome 
Statute . . .  
See Jalloh, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, supra note 202, at 121. However, according to Jalloh,  
Kenya’s view of admissibility broadens the complementarity test to give the appearance that 
the . . . cases at issue belong within the realm of the inadmissible. In doing so, however, it 
oversimplifies the matter and boils the entire inquiry down to whether or not the national 
jurisdiction asserts a claim over the case and gives some promise to proceed with 
investigations or prosecutions. The idea that an ICC state party enjoys the first right to 
prosecute rests on solid ground in the Rome Statute. But the suggestion that, in the context of 
an admissibility challenge, mere promises to proceed with the investigation of an amorphous 
group of unidentified suspects that may or may not include those currently before the Court 
swings the pendulum too far in the opposite direction. It also masks serious concerns about 
the genuineness of the East African nation’s investigations. . . 
Id. at 122. Jalloh also evaluates the test for complementarity adopted by the Appeals Chamber in the 
Kenya admissibility decision: 
By essentially retaining the strict same-person, same-conduct test, which on its face granted 
no margin of appreciation for states to make different investigative or charging decisions 
from those of the ICC prosecutor, the Appeals Chamber places stringent demands on states. 
From a pro-accountability point of view, this high threshold may perhaps be apt at this 
adolescent stage of the Court’s life. Nevertheless, in the long term it could undermine 
reasonable national efforts to prosecute by going against the logic of the burden-sharing goals 
of complementarity. Worse, it may also hinder the growth of effective national jurisdictions 
willing and able to prosecute the crimes, especially in Africa, which is so far the only scene of 
the Hague tribunal’s investigations and prosecutions and where Kenya has a relatively more 
functional criminal justice system than most of the other countries.  
Id. at 122. 
 213. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7 (1). 
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(a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d) Deportation or 
forcible transfer of population; (e) Imprisonment or severe 
deprivation of physical liberty in violation of international law; 
(f) Torture; (g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual 
violence of comparable gravity; (h) Persecution against any 
identifiable group . . . on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, 
religious, gender . . . or other grounds universally recognized as 
impermissible under international law, in connection with any act 
referred to [in the same paragraph] or any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court; (i) Enforced disappearance of persons; 
(j) . . . apartheid; (k) [and] [o]ther inhumane acts of a similar 
character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to 
body or to mental or physical health.
214
 
The ICC Prosecutor divided the situation in Kenya into two cases. The 
original defendants in the first case were William Samoei Ruto, Henry 
Kiprono Kosgey, and Joshua Arap Sang. The original defendants in the 
second case were Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, and 
Mohammed Hussein Ali.
215
  
As reflected in the ICC Prosecutor’s application for summonses, 
“[William Samoei Ruto] (‘Ruto’) and [Henry Kiprono Kosgey] 
(‘Kosgey’), prominent leaders of the Orange Democratic Movement 
(‘ODM’) political party, began preparing a criminal plan to attack those 
identified as supporters of the Party of National Unity (‘PNU’).”216 
“[Joshua Arap Sang] (‘Sang’), a prominent ODM supporter, was a crucial 
part of the plan, using his radio program to collect supporters and provide 
signals to members of the plan on when and where to attack.”217 In order 
to meet their goal, Ruto, Kosgey, and Sang “coordinated a series of actors 
and institutions to establish a network, using it to implement an 
organizational policy to commit crimes.”218 “Their two goals were: (1) to 
 
 
 214. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7 (1)(a)–(k). 
 215. Nzau Musau & Simon Jennings, Two Kenyan Suspects Off The Hook, INST, FOR WAR & 
PEACE REPORTING (Apr. 24, 2012), http://iwpr.net/report-news/acr-issue-318 (“The OTP investigated 
both sides in the conflict, and divided the six suspects accordingly into two cases – Ruto, Arap Sang 
and Kosgey representing the Orange Democratic Movement, ODM; and Muthaura, Kenyatta, and 
Hussein Ali from the Party of National Unity, PNU.”). 
 216. See Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09, Prosecutor’s Application 
Pursuant to Article 58 as to William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, ¶ 1, 
(Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1367853.pdf . 
 217. Id. ¶ 1. 
 218. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss4/7
  
 
 
 
 
2014] THE ICC KENYA CASE 745 
 
 
 
 
gain power in the Rift Valley Province, Kenya (“Rift Valley”), and 
ultimately in the Republic of Kenya, and (2) to punish and expel from the 
Rift Valley those perceived to support the PNU (collectively referred to as 
‘PNU supporters’).”219 Supporters groomed by Ruto, Kosgey and Sang 
carried out “their plan by attacking PNU supporters immediately after the 
announcement of the [Kenyan] presidential election results . . . .”220 Their 
attacks focused on specific locations “including Turbo town, the greater 
Eldoret area (Huruma, Kimumu, Langas, and Yamumbi), Kapsabet town, 
and Nandi Hills town.”221 Supporters “burn[ed] down PNU supporters’ 
homes and businesses, killing civilians, and systematically driving them 
from their homes.”222 In addition, a church “was attacked and burned with 
more than one hundred people inside. At least 17 people died.”223 Each 
attack was carried out “in a uniform fashion.”224 
According to the ICC Prosecutor, as a result of the attacks orchestrated 
by Ruto, Kosgey, and Sang on PNU supporters, and in order to manage 
protests organized by the ODM, Kenyan officials Francis Kirimi Muthaura 
(“Muthaura”), Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta (“Kenyatta”), and Mohammed 
Hussein Ali (“Ali”) “developed and executed a plan to attack perceived 
ODM supporters in order to keep the PNU in power.”225 Under the 
National Security Advisory Committee, which was led by Muthaura and 
participated in by Ali, the Kenyan police were “deployed into ODM 
strongholds where they used excessive force against civilian protesters in 
Kisumu (Kisumu District, Nyanza Province) and in Kibera (Kibera 
Division, Nairobi Province).”226 During the approximate time span of one 
year, the Kenyan police “shot at and killed more than a hundred ODM 
supporters in Kisumu and Kibera.”227 
Muthaura subsequently contacted Ali, “his subordinate as head of the 
Kenya Police, and instructed Ali not to interfere with the movement of 
pro‐ PNU youth, including the Mungiki.”228 In addition, Kenyatta ordered 
the Mungiki leaders to another meeting “to finalize logistical and financial 
arrangements for the retaliatory attacks.”229 As part of these attacks, “the 
 
 
 219. Id.  
 220. Id. ¶ 3. 
 221. Id.  
 222. Id.  
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. ¶ 4.  
 225. See id. ¶ 5. 
 226. Id. ¶ 6. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. ¶ 7. 
 229. Id.  
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attackers identified ODM supporters by going from door to door and by 
setting up road blocks for intercepting vehicles, killing over 150 ODM 
supporters.”230 In total, the post-election violence in Kenya “resulted in 
more than 1,100 people dead, 3,500 injured, approximately 600,000 
victims of forcible displacement, at least hundreds of victims of rape and 
sexual violence and more than 100,000 properties destroyed in six out of 
eight of Kenya’s provinces. Many women and girls perceived as 
supporting the ODM were raped.”231 
The PTC granted the Prosecutor’s request for summonses to appear for 
suspects Ruto, Kosgey and Sang. In particular, the PTC found “reasonable 
grounds to believe that Ruto and Kosgey are criminally responsible under 
article 25(3)(a) of the [Rome] Statute for [particular] crimes against 
humanity. . . .”232 The PTC also found “reasonable grounds to believe that 
Sang is criminally responsible under article 25(3)(d) . . . for [particular] 
crimes against humanity.”233 For these three suspects, the particular crimes 
against humanity for which the PTC found “reasonable grounds” were 
murder, forcible transfer of population and persecution.
234
 As a result of 
the PTC’s determinations concerning Ruto, Sang, and Kosgey, it 
“[decided] to issue summonses to appear . . . for the three persons, being 
satisfied that this measure [would be] sufficient to ensure their appearance 
before the Court.”235  
The PTC also granted summonses to appear for suspects Muthaura, 
Kenyatta and Ali. In particular, the PTC found that “there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that Kenyatta and Muthaura are criminally responsible 
 
 
 230. Id. ¶ 8. 
 231. Id. ¶ 9.  
 232. See Prosecutor v. Ruto,Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application 
for Summons to Appear for William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey, and Joshua Arap Sang, 
¶ 49 (Mar. 8, 2011) at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1037044.pdf.  
 233. Id. ¶ 53. Article 25(3)(d) reads:  
In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for 
punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person: 
 (d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such a 
crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be 
intentional and shall either: (i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or 
criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; or (ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of 
the group to commit the crime[.]  
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 25(3)(d). 
 234. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, supra note 202, ¶ 57. The PTC declined to find that Ruto, 
Sang and Kosgey had committed the crime against humanity of torture. Id. ¶ 33. 
 235. Id. ¶ 59. 
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as indirect co-perpetrators [for particular crimes against humanity] . . .”236 
Concerning Ali, the PTC found that “there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that [he] is criminally responsible under article 25(3)(d) of the 
Statute for having contributed to the commission of [particular] crimes 
against humanity.
237
 For these three suspects, the particular crimes against 
humanity for which the PTC found “reasonable grounds” were murder (in 
the towns of Nakuru and Naivasha), forcible transfer of population (in 
Nakuru and Naivasha), rape (in Nakuru), other inhumane acts (in Nakuru 
and Naivasha), and persecution (in Nakuru and Naivasha).
238
 Because of 
its findings regarding these crimes, the PTC decided to issue summonses 
to appear for Muthaura, Kenyatta, and Ali, “being satisfied that this 
measure is sufficient to ensure their appearance before the Court.”239 
The charges brought against Ruto and Sang, which were upheld by the 
Appeals Chamber, are crimes against humanity under articles 5 and 7 of 
the Rome Statute. In particular, Ruto and Sang are charged with “murder, 
deportation or forcible transfer of population, and persecution.”240 The 
charges brought against Muthaura and Kenyatta, which were upheld by the 
Appeals Chamber, are crimes against humanity under article 5 and 7 of the 
Rome Statute. In particular, Muthaura and Kenyatta were charged with 
“murder, deportation or forcible transfer of population, rape and other 
forms of sexual violence, other inhumane acts and persecution.”241  
 
 
 236. See Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Prosecutor’s 
Application for Summonses to Appear for Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, and 
Mohammed Hussein Ali, ¶ 45 (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1037052.pdf. 
 237. Id. ¶ 51. For the text of article 25(3)(d), see supra text accompanying note 233. 
 238. Id. ¶ 56. 
 239. Id. ¶ 57. 
 240. See Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on the appeals of Mr. William 
Samoei Ruto and Mr. Joshua Arap Sang against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 23 January 
2012 entitled “Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the 
Rome Statute,” ¶ 23 (May 23, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1417531.pdf. The Appeals 
Chamber found that the issues raised on appeal by Ruto and Sang were not articulated appropriately; 
that is, the issues were not ones of subject matter jurisdiction (as contended by defendants) but rather 
had to do with the substantive merits of the case (i.e., the interpretation of “organizational policy” for 
crimes against humanity and whether such a policy existed). Id. ¶ 33. See also Rome Statute, supra 
note 1, art. 7.  
 241. See Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the appeal of Mr. 
Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Mr. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II 
of 23 January 2012 entitled “Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and 
(b) of the Rome Statute,” ¶ 30 (May 24, 2012) [hereinafter Appeal of Muthaura and Uhuru], 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1417533.pdf. See also Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7. The 
Appeals Chamber found that the issues raised on appeal by Muthaura and Kenyatta were not 
articulated appropriately; that is, the issues were not ones of subject matter jurisdiction (as contended 
by defendants) but rather had to do with the substantive merits of the case (i.e., the interpretation of 
“organizational policy” for crimes against humanity and whether such a policy existed). Appeal of 
Muthaura and Uhuru, supra, ¶ 38. Note that the crimes against humanity charges in the Kenya case 
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Though charges were confirmed against Ruto, Sang, Muthaura, and 
Kenyatta, neither the charges against Kosgey nor the charges against Ali 
were confirmed.
242
 In particular, the Court deemed the testimony of the 
Prosecutor’s main witness against Kosgey as insufficient evidence for 
proving criminal responsibility for crimes against humanity: 
Having examined the evidence available as a whole, the Chamber 
does not find sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to 
 
 
marks the first time the ICC has attempted to prosecute these crimes outside armed conflict. The 
prosecution of crimes against humanity outside formal, armed conflict broadens the reach of 
international law and courts into a state’s traditional sovereign domain. See Carey Shenkman, 
Catalyzing National Judicial Capacity: The ICC’s First Crimes Against Humanity Out-side Armed 
Conflict, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (2012) [hereinafter Catalyzing National Judicial Capacity]. See also 
Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 7(1) (requiring no armed conflict under crimes against humanity). The 
ICC is the first international tribunal to formally remove “armed conflict” as a de jure or de facto 
requirement for crimes against humanity. This lack of a requirement that crimes of humanity be linked 
with armed conflict was influential in the ICC being able to initiate proceedings in Kenya. See 
generally Shenkman, Catalyzing National Judicial Capacity. Shenkman also argues that the ICC can 
act as a “capacity catalyst” and through its work bring about internal judicial reforms in national 
jurisdictions. Id. at 1234. Shenkman defines “capacity catalyst” as the “indirect promotion of state-
level judicial reform” and argues that this definition should be used to analyze the capacity building 
role of the ICC. Id. She forms her arguments primarily by adding to proactive complementarity 
arguments previously made by William Burke. Id. See William W. Burke-White, Proactive 
Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of 
International Justice, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53, 58 (2008) (“The possibility of international prosecution 
can create incentives that make states more willing to investigate and prosecute international crimes 
themselves.”). Finally, Shenkman argues that defensive reactions made by the Kenyan government in 
response to possible ICC intervention, no matter how little, are “soft law” actions that show the impact 
the ICC has in facilitating judicial reform in states where it decides to launch an investigation into 
international crimes. Shenkman, Catalyzing National Judicial Capacity, supra, at 1248. These 
responses also promoted internal dialogue where none previously existed. Id. 
 242. Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Public Redacted Version Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ¶¶ 2, 93, 138 (Jan 
23, 2012) [hereinafter Confirmation of Charges #1], http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc 
1314535.pdf. The Chamber did confirm the charge of crimes against humanity against Mr. Ruto (i.e., 
for murder, deportation or forcible transfer of population and persecution). See id. ¶¶ 299, 349. See 
also id. ¶ 138. Mr. Sang’s charges for crimes against humanity were also confirmed; in particular, Mr. 
Sang was charged with the crimes against humanity of murder, deportation or forcible transfer of 
population and persecution. See id. ¶¶ 357, 366, 367. See also id. ¶ 138. See also Prosecutor v. 
Muthaura, Case No. ICC-01/09-02, Public Redacted Version Decision on the Confirmation of Charges 
Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ¶¶ 424–427, 430 & p. 154 (Jan. 23, 2012), 
[hereinafter Confirmation of Charges #2], http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1314543.pdf. Mr. 
Muthaura and Mr. Kenyatta had charges confirmed by the PTC. In particular, Mr. Muthaura and Mr. 
Kenyatta were charged as “indirect co-perpetrators” for the following crimes against humanity: 
murder, deportation or forcible transfer of population, rape, other inhumane acts, and persecution. Id. 
¶¶ 428–429. However, Mr. Muthaura and Mr. Kenyatta were not charged with “other forms of sexual 
violence.” Id. at 154. A confirmation of charges hearing is held by the Pre-Trial Chamber to determine 
whether there is “sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the person 
committed the crime charged.” If the Pre-Trial Chamber confirms the charges, the Chamber commits 
the person to trial before a Trial Chamber, which will conduct the subsequent phase of the proceedings 
(i.e., the trial). See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 61(5) & (7).  
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believe that Mr. Kosgey is criminally responsible as an indirect co-
perpetrator with Mr. Ruto and others . . . or under any other 
alternative mode of liability for . . . crimes against humanity . . . The 
Chamber reaches this finding upon evaluation of the evidence 
available before it, provided by both parties. In particular, the 
Prosecutor primarily relies on the detailed description of one 
anonymous witness (Witness 6) to prove the allegations regarding 
Mr. Kosgey’s role within the organisation. As the Chamber stated 
[previously in the decision] . . . , anonymous witness statements 
have lower probative value and, in the absence of corroboration of 
the key facts alleged by the Prosecutor, the evidence presented 
might not be deemed sufficient to commit a person to trial.
243
 
Concerning defendant Ali, the Prosecutor alleged that Ali was responsible 
for “the inaction of the Kenya police” and that this “made possible and 
strengthened the Mungiki attack in or around Nakuru and Naivasha.”244 
The Court first determined that “in order to hold Mr. Ali criminally 
responsible under the Statute for crimes allegedly committed through the 
Kenya Police, it is essential that it first be determined that the Kenya 
Police indeed carried out the objective elements of the crimes charged, 
whether by a positive conduct or by way of inaction. This is rooted in 
fundamental principles of criminal law, according to which it is necessary 
to determine at first the occurrence of the alleged historical event(s) and, if 
sufficiently established, the existence of a link between such events and 
the suspect. Only if and when there is a positive determination of 
imputatio facti to a suspect, is it possible to proceed to the assessment as to 
whether the link between the historical event(s) and the suspect grounds 
his or her criminal responsibility (imputatio iuris).”245 Regarding Ali, the 
Court held: 
The evidence placed before [the Chamber] does not provide 
substantial grounds to believe that the Kenya Police participated in 
the attack in or around Nakuru and Naivasha, i.e. that there existed 
an identifiable course of conduct of the Kenya Police amounting to 
a participation, by way of inaction, in the attack perpetrated by the 
Mungiki in or around Nakuru and Naivasha. Since the Chamber is 
not satisfied that the historical events alleged by the Prosecutor took 
place, it is not possible to entertain further the attribution of any 
 
 
 243. Confirmation of Charges #1, supra note 242, at 138, ¶ 293.  
 244. Confirmation of Charges #2, supra note 242.  
 245. Id. ¶ 424. 
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conduct of the Kenyan Police to Mr. Ali, and, a fortiori, his 
individual criminal responsibility. Accordingly, the Chamber is of 
the view that there is not sufficient evidence to establish substantial 
grounds to believe that Mr. Ali committed the crimes charged.
246
 
Subsequently, in March of 2013, the charges against Muthaura were also 
withdrawn, and the case against him officially ended: 
In the present case, the Prosecution has submitted that current 
evidence does not support the charges against Mr Muthaura and that 
it has no reasonable prospect of securing evidence that could sustain 
proof beyond reasonable doubt. Significantly, the Muthaura 
Defence does not contest the Prosecution’s withdrawal. In these 
circumstances, the Chamber . . . considers that the withdrawal of 
charges against Mr Muthaura may be granted.
247
  
VII. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS  
The selection and application of the Prosecutor’s proprio motu power 
to initiate an investigation into the situation in Kenya sets a new precedent 
at the ICC, and in the process provides the Prosecutor a more certain path 
through which to combat international crime and the impunity issue. 
Instead of having to “wait and see” if a state party or the UN Security 
Council will refer an international crime case to the ICC, the Kenya case 
highlights the ability and power of the ICC prosecutor to begin crime 
investigations herself. But at the same time the case reveals certain 
limitations on this power, which together should assuage any legitimate 
concerns of its abuse for political or other improper ends.  
Indeed, the PTC, as evidenced in the Kenya case, will be closely 
examining the Prosecutor’s proprio motu power, and setting relatively 
stringent requirements for its application and use. For example, the 
Prosecutor may be required to provide additional information to the PTC 
so that it can better assess procedural matters, such as the admissibility of 
the case under the complementarity principle, as well as substantive 
matters such as information to assist the Court with determining whether 
 
 
 246. Confirmation of Charges #2, supra note 242, at 154, ¶¶ 425–427, 430. 
 247. Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the withdrawal of charges 
against Mr Muthaura, ¶ 11 (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1568411.pdf. Note 
also that on December 5, 2014, the ICC Prosecutor filed a notice of withdraw of charges against 
defendant Kenyatta. On March 13, 2015, the case against Kenyatta was officially terminated by the 
ICC. See supra note 1.  
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certain elements of crimes are indeed satisfied.
248
 In particular, to enable 
the PTC to determine whether a case is admissible before the court at this 
stage under the admissibility principles of complementarity and gravity, it 
appears that the Prosecutor must henceforth provide the following 
description:  
(i) the groups of persons involved that are likely to be the focus of 
an investigation for the purpose of shaping the future case(s); and 
(ii) the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court allegedly 
committed during the incidents that are likely to be the focus of an 
investigation for the purpose of shaping the future case(s).
249
 
As a result of having to meet this particular admissibility “hurdle,” the 
prosecutor may be limited in the future in the number of successful 
proprio motu requests that she can make. This is because evidence at the 
level of specificity required by the PTC to satisfy these admissibility 
criteria may not always be available to the Prosecutor. For example, 
evidence required to meet the PTC’s gravity assessment at this stage—
“means of [crime execution] . . . [and] the impact of the crimes and harm 
caused to victims and their families,”250—may be difficult to acquire due 
to evidence destruction, reluctance of witnesses and victims to testify, or 
for other reasons. More broadly, it may not always be possible to 
determine which particular international crimes within the Court’s 
jurisdiction were committed during specific incidents, as the 
complementarity and gravity inquiries apparently now require at the early 
proprio motu stage, due to the numerous and detailed factual and legal 
elements that make up these crimes (e.g., crimes against humanity or war 
crimes). 
Finally, regarding even successful proprio motu requests by the 
Prosecutor, the Kenya precedent suggests that any authorized 
investigations will be subject to fairly strict constraints imposed by the 
PTC. For example, the PTC in the Kenya case placed both temporal and 
substantive limits on the Prosecutor’s ability to investigate the post-
 
 
 248. See infra notes 249 & 250 and accompanying text. 
 249. PTC Authorization of Investigation, supra note 98, ¶ 50. 
 250. Id. ¶ 62. For the factors required of the PTC at the proprio motu stage to show that the 
relevant crimes are grave (i.e., the crimes that make up the incidents that are likely to be further 
investigated for future cases), see id. and supra note 117 and accompanying text. Apparently, in the 
Kenya case, this information, or evidence, to satisfy the gravity assessment was not as difficult to 
acquire. PTC Authorization of Investigation, supra note 98, ¶¶ 193, 198–200 (noting specific 
evidentiary facts about the nature of the post-election violence and the means by which the violence 
was carried out). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
752 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 13:699 
 
 
 
 
election violence (i.e., a limited timeframe based on crime occurrence and 
a “content limit” based on crime type).251 Such an imposition of 
constraints helps to ensure that the Prosecutor does not pursue more 
“open-ended” investigations that could be viewed as unjustified 
encroachments on state sovereignty. At the same time, however, the 
constraints necessarily limit the ability of the Prosecutor to address other 
international or domestic crimes occurring during the situation in question, 
and hence potentially undermine the ICC goal of ending impunity.
252
 In 
this regard, the Prosecutor is not without a partial solution, at least with 
regard to other international crimes that fall within the Court’s 
jurisdiction—he could seemingly return to the PTC to request 
authorization to investigate these other crimes (i.e., with the goal of 
prosecuting them).
253
  
Perhaps as equally noteworthy as the PTC’s decision to approve the 
prosecutor’s proprio motu request in Kenya is the further elucidation by 
the ICC judges in the Kenya case of the complementarity principle. 
Overall, in both the PTC and Appeals Chamber admissibility decisions 
addressing the complementarity principle, a relatively high and rigid 
standard for finding a case inadmissible under the principle before the ICC 
emerges.
254
 This is problematic insofar as it may “tilt” the balance of 
shared roles in international crime investigation and prosecution between 
the ICC and national jurisdictions under the complementarity principle too 
far in the direction of the former (i.e., the ICC), and in the process overly 
encroach on a state’s sovereign authority to investigate and prosecute 
international crimes within its own borders. In addition, the 
complementarity standard itself, at least as it was articulated and explained 
 
 
 251. Id. ¶¶ 207–209. 
 252. For evidence that one of the goals of the ICC is to end impunity for international crimes, see 
Rome Statute, supra note 1, at preamble, ¶¶ 4–5 (“Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to 
the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution 
must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation. 
. . . Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to 
the prevention of such crimes.”). 
 253. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 15(1) & (5). “The refusal of the Pre-Trial Chamber to 
authorize the investigation shall not preclude the presentation of a subsequent request by the 
Prosecutor based on new facts or evidence regarding the same situation.” Id. art. 15(5). Support for 
this proposition rests in article 15(5), which suggests that the prosecutor can make multiple proprio 
motu requests regarding the same situation (albeit after having been denied authority to investigate 
regarding that situation previously). Id. See also id. art. 53(4). “The Prosecutor may, at any time, 
reconsider a decision whether to initiate an investigation or prosecution based on new facts or 
information.” Id.  
 254. See Article 19 Appeal, supra note 200, at ¶ 25 (Usaka, J., dissenting) (“In the Impugned 
Decision, however, the Chamber applied what appear to be a high burden of proof and a demanding 
definition of ‘investigation.’”). 
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by the Court, may exclude alternative, non-prosecutorial responses to 
crime by national jurisdictions, such as truth commissions and other 
approaches.  
For example, based on the Kenyan precedent, the national jurisdiction 
challenging case admissibility under the complementarity principle must 
show, to avoid a finding of prosecutorial or investigative “inaction” (and 
hence admissibility before the ICC), that it is investigating or prosecuting 
the same suspects for substantially the same conduct (i.e., as the ICC).
255
 
Moreover, to qualify as an “investigation” for this “same person, 
substantially the same conduct” test, the state must show that it is pursuing 
specific “steps” to discover whether those same persons/suspects are 
responsible for that conduct.
256
 The PTC and Appeals Chamber provide 
examples of such “steps”: “interviewing witnesses or suspects, collecting 
documentary evidence, or carrying out forensic analyses.”257  
Accordingly, under this new complementarity test, if the national 
jurisdiction, based on its own formal inquiries and fact-finding related to 
criminal incidents, focuses its investigations and/or prosecutions on other 
suspects, including high-level ones, that are not the focus of the ICC 
investigation and prosecutorial effort, then the case remains admissible 
before the ICC. In addition, though there may be some flexibility under 
the “conduct” prong of the test (i.e., the conduct investigated and/ or 
prosecuted by the state must only be “substantially” the same as the 
conduct investigated and/or prosecuted by the ICC for the case to be found 
inadmissible before the ICC), ultimately this prong may easily be 
interpreted in the direction of admissibility before the ICC.  
For example, the ICC Prosecutor could argue in a complementarity 
challenge filed by a state that the conduct she is interested in prosecuting 
corresponds to a different criminal charge (for example, crimes against 
humanity) than the charges being pursued by the state (for example, the 
domestic crime of murder). Since the elements of these criminal charges 
are different, the Prosecutor could argue and the Court could find that 
different “conduct” is implicated.258 Alternatively, the Prosecutor may 
 
 
 255. See Article 19 Decision, supra note 197, at 6–9, 22–23. See also supra note 211 and text 
accompanying note 210. 
 256. See supra notes 210 and 211 and accompanying text. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Note that this potential argument by the Prosecutor in response to a complementarity 
challenge by a state has perhaps been weakened by a recent decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber in the 
Libya case. See Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Decision on the admissibility of the 
case of against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi,” ¶¶ 85 (May 13, 2013) [hereinafter Decision on the Case 
Against Gaddafi], http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1599307.pdf (“The Chamber is of the view 
that the assessment of domestic proceedings should focus on the alleged conduct and not its legal 
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pursue altogether distinct crimes and, hence, “conduct” as compared to 
that pursued by the state (for example, the state may be pursuing murder 
investigations while the ICC Prosecutor is interested in “war crimes” 
involving the destruction of property).
259
 Finally, the state and Prosecutor 
may be interested in conduct that, though it qualifies as essentially the 
same crime (for example, murder), is adjudged not to be “substantially the 
same” because it is part of a distinct criminal event, or incident (for 
example, incidents with different factual contexts, modus operandi, 
locations and/or timeframes). In each of these scenarios put forth above, 
different suspects in the same “high-level” hierarchy or (somewhat) 
different conduct, the ICC “wins” in a jurisdictional challenge between it 
and the nation-state over the complementarity principle.  
These scenarios appear to illustrate that the shared role national 
jurisdictions have with the ICC under the Rome Statute, investigating and 
prosecuting international crimes and in the process ending impunity for 
these crimes, is perhaps not being taken as “seriously” as it should be by 
 
 
characterisation. The question of whether domestic investigations are carried out with a view to 
prosecuting ‘international crimes’ is not determinative of an admissibility challenge.”). See also id. 
¶ 88.  
“It follows that a domestic investigation or prosecution for “ordinary crimes[,]’ . . . to the 
extent that the case covers the same conduct, shall be considered sufficient. It is the 
Chamber’s view that Libya’s current lack of legislation criminalising crimes against humanity 
does not per se render the case admissible before the Court.” (relying on the language from 
the Rome Statute’s ne bis id idem statute and the Statute’s drafting history).  
Id.  
 259. For an example of such a war crime, see Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(a)(iv) (“For the 
purpose of this statute, ‘war crimes’ means: . . . Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, 
not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly”). See also id. art. 
8(2)(b)(xvi)(crime of pillaging). In addition, the Prosecutor may be interested in other war crimes 
involving sexual crimes or the displacement of persons. See id. arts. 2(e)(viii) (displacement) & 
8(2)(b)(xxii)(sex crimes). See also Jalloh, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, supra note 202, at 121–
22. 
The majority’s reasoning [in the Kenyan admissibility decision by the Appeals Chamber] 
endorses an extremely narrow reading of the nature, scope, and purpose of Article 17. 
Admittedly, in its first decision to deal frontally with this issue, the Appeals Chamber has 
amended the same-person, same-conduct test to the ‘same-person, substantially same-
conduct’ test. The qualified test seems designed to maintain the national investigative 
spotlight on the same suspect as the one before the Court but appears to require only a rough 
equivalence in pursuing the impugned conduct. This approach makes sense, although it is 
difficult to imagine that a national prosecutor would choose to charge a suspect with harder-
to-prove international crimes, such as crimes against humanity, if the same conduct could be 
more easily characterized as ordinary murder for the purpose of securing a conviction under 
domestic law. Be that as it may, the revised test still leaves ample room for outright [ICC-
level] judicial rejections of any legitimate national attempt to prosecute the ICC crimes that 
occur within a state’s territory on the basis that it does not address substantially the same 
conduct.  
Id. at 122. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss4/7
  
 
 
 
 
2014] THE ICC KENYA CASE 755 
 
 
 
 
the ICC.
260
 In other words, the “same person, substantially the same 
conduct” test, because it demands so much from a state before a case is 
found inadmissible before the ICC under the complementarity principle, 
may overly favor the Court in the allocation of this shared role. Perhaps a 
complementarity “test” that led to a finding of inadmissibility before the 
ICC if the state investigated or prosecuted international or domestic 
criminal conduct occurring during contextually similar incidents involving 
the same or greater levels of seriousness, or gravity, as the criminal 
conduct in the ICC proceedings, would better strike the balance between 
national jurisdictions and the ICC in their respective roles under the 
complementarity regime. Such a test finds some support in both the Rome 
Statute and the recent admissibility/ complementarity decision by the PTC 
in the Libya case.
261
 Thus, applying this suggested test to the Kenya case, 
 
 
 260. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at pmbl. (“Emphasizing that the International Criminal Court 
established under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions”). See also id. 
art. 1 (“[The ICC] shall be a permanent institution and shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction 
over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in this Statute, and 
shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.”). 
 261. This suggested complementarity test finds some support in the Rome Statute: 
Within one month of receipt of that notification [i.e., notification to a State with jurisdiction 
that the Prosecutor has begun an investigation proprio motu into crimes within the Court’s 
jurisdiction], a State may inform the Court that it is investigating or has investigated its 
nationals or others within its jurisdiction with respect to criminal acts which may constitute 
crimes referred to in article 5 and which relate to the information provided in the notification 
to States. At the request of that State, the Prosecutor shall defer to the State’s investigation of 
those persons unless the Pre-Trial Chamber, on the application of the Prosecutor, decides to 
authorize the investigation. 
See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 18 (2)(italics supplied for emphasis). Thus, since “may” is 
permissive, the focus appears to be on criminal conduct, or “acts,” and not necessarily on Article 5 
crimes (e.g., genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes). Also, the “relate” language would 
appear to indicate that the conduct under investigation by the state and ICC occur during at least 
“similar” incidents (whether because of modus operandi, overall context, location, timeframe, etc.). 
See also id. at Preamble: 
Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole 
must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking 
measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation[;] Determined to 
put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes [i.e., most serious crimes] and thus 
to contribute to the prevention of such crimes; Recalling that it is the duty of every State to 
exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes[;] . . . 
Emphasizing that the International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be 
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions[.] 
Id. (italics added for emphasis). “Seriousness” for purposes of the suggested test could be evaluated 
with reference to the harm suffered by the victim, means rea, “average” or “typical” sentence attached 
to the crime in domestic jurisdictions (or, if available, by international courts), etc. Finally, the Court 
could use its existing “gravity” jurisprudence to facilitate its determination of crime “seriousness.”  
 Note that the recent decision in the Libya situation by the Pre-Trial Chamber concerning 
admissibility under the complementarity principle noted that the focus of the complementarity inquiry 
should be on the substantive criminal acts, or conduct (as opposed to whether an act is considered 
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since no international or domestic prosecutions or investigations have 
occurred there related to the post-election violence for the alleged crimes 
against humanity or other international or domestic criminal conduct of 
the same gravity (e.g., indiscriminate killings/murders), the case would 
remain admissible before the ICC. However, if Kenya were to investigate 
or prosecute a person for a crime against humanity or another international 
or domestic crime implicating underlying acts that are the same or greater 
in their level of seriousness as compared to the criminal conduct targeted 
in the ICC proceedings,
262
 and this crime occurred as part of the post-
 
 
“domestic” or “international” in nature), and that national investigations related to either domestic or 
international criminal conduct “count” under the complementarity test as long as the underlying 
conduct being investigated by the state is “substantially the same” as the conduct targeted by the ICC 
proceedings. See supra note 258. See also Decision on the Case Against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, ¶ 108 
(May 31, 2013), at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1599307.pdf. “[T]he Chamber is of the view 
that there is no requirement under the Statute that the investigation at the national level be aimed at the 
prosecution of ‘international’ crimes as long as the investigation covers the same conduct”. Id. The 
PTC in the Libya admissibility decision also emphasized that “similar incidents” was no longer a 
requirement of the complementarity “test” (i.e., same person / substantially the same conduct” test); 
however, the PTC in its Libya decision did stress “the ICC proceedings” language, or requirement, 
within the “same person, substantially the same conduct” test. Id. ¶ 76. “However, rather than referring 
to ‘incidents,’ the Appeals Chamber [in the Kenya admissibility decision] referred to [substantially the 
same] the conduct ‘as alleged in the proceedings before the Court.’” Id. The proposed test for 
complementarity suggested in this Article re-incorporates the “similar incidents requirement” because 
though the conduct being targeted by the State and the ICC may essentially be the same under the “as 
alleged in the ICC proceedings” requirement, the incidents in which the conduct occurred could be 
completely unrelated in time, location and overall context. This does not make logical sense if one of 
the central goals of the ICC is to end impunity for particular crimes; thus, bringing back the “similar 
incidents” language ensures to a greater extent this important goal. 
 Ultimately, the PTC in the Libya admissibility decision addressing complementarity found that 
(1) the domestic legislation of Libya “may sufficiently capture” the criminal conduct targeted by the 
ICC proceedings; and (2) the criminal conduct, or case, being investigated by Libya related to 
defendant Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi is not substantially the same as the conduct, or case, being 
investigated by the ICC in its proceedings. See id. ¶¶ 113, 116–17, 135. This latter conclusion arises, 
according to the PTC, because Libya failed to provide sufficient detail regarding the scope of its 
national investigations. Id. ¶¶ 123, 135. However, the PTC did note that there were certain aspects of 
the conduct by Gaddafi under investigation by the ICC with regard to which Libya was taking 
particular investigative steps. See id. ¶¶ 132, 134. In addition, and unrelated to the first prong, or 
“limb,” of the complementarity inquiry dealing with whether an ICC case is being investigated by the 
national jurisdiction (i.e., the same person, substantially the same conduct test), the PTC in the Libya 
admissibility decision also found that Libya was genuinely unable to carry out an investigation or 
prosecution of Mr. Gaddafi. Id. ¶¶ 216–17. Ultimately, the PTC found that the case against Gaddafi 
was admissible before the ICC. See id. ¶¶ 218,  
 262. For example, if the underlying conduct for the crime against humanity by the ICC involved 
particular violence against persons (e.g., murder), which it does in the Kenya case, then the state would 
need to also focus on this underlying conduct in its investigations or prosecutions. In Kenya, other 
international crimes under the Rome Statute such as genocide or war crimes did not occur, but had 
they occurred, and Kenya investigated and/or prosecuted the same crimes involving underlying acts as 
“serious,” or grave, as the underlying acts of crimes against humanity charged by the ICC (i.e., 
murder), then under the test posited in this Article the case would be inadmissible before the ICC. The 
complementarity test put forward in this Article finds some support in the Rome Statute: 
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election violence in Kenya, the case would become inadmissible before 
the ICC under this suggested, “alternative” complementarity test. Such a 
test that is more concerned with the seriousness, or gravity, of criminal 
conduct, whether domestic or international in nature, would seem to better 
capture the shared role bestowed by the Rome Statute on states and the 
ICC in prosecuting, investigating and ultimately ending impunity for grave 
crimes. Though the test allows some flexibility by the state as to the 
person or persons selected for investigation or prosecution, and hence 
respects state sovereignty in this regard, ultimately the state, in order to 
prevent the ICC from exercising jurisdiction under the complementarity 
principle, must investigate or prosecute a person for criminal conduct 
occurring during a similar incident (i.e., “context”) and involving the same 
or greater level of seriousness (i.e., as the ICC crime). These requirements 
would contribute to ending impunity for grave crimes while respecting the 
important role states have under the Rome complementarity system.  
Another potential affront to state sovereignty in the complementarity 
assessment put forward by the Court in the Kenya case is the type of 
activities that qualify as “investigations” and hence merit “deferral” to the 
national jurisdiction by the ICC under the complementarity principle. For 
example, to qualify as an investigation, both the PTC and Appeals 
Chamber in their Article 19 admissibility decisions implicating 
complementarity suggested that only more “traditional” investigative 
responses to crime would suffice—interviewing witnesses or suspects, 
collecting documentary evidence, or carrying out forensic analyses to 
determine whether particular suspects are responsible for crime.
263
 And in 
a portion of their decisions, the PTC indicated and the Appeals Chamber 
 
 
Within one month of receipt of that notification [i.e., notification to a State with jurisdiction 
that the Prosecutor has begun an investigation proprio motu into crimes within the Court’s 
jurisdiction], a State may inform the Court that it is investigating or has investigated its 
nationals or others within its jurisdiction with respect to criminal acts which may constitute 
crimes referred to in article 5 and which relate to the information provided in the notification 
to States. At the request of that State, the Prosecutor shall defer to the State’s investigation of 
those persons unless the Pre-Trial Chamber, on the application of the Prosecutor, decides to 
authorize the investigation.  
See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 18(2) (italics supplied for emphasis). 
 263. See supra notes 198, 211, 257 & accompanying text. Also, the way in which the Appeals 
Chamber refers to the “parallel” state investigations in its Kenya decision suggests that only more 
“traditional” criminal justice efforts by states would qualify under the complementarity assessment 
(and prevent ICC jurisdiction over the crimes in question). For example, the Chamber refers to 
whether the “same case” is being investigated at the same time by the ICC and the state, and in various 
parts of its decision the Chamber refers to investigating “suspects.” These references are to 
terminology generally reserved for formal, criminal justice processes. See Article 19 Decision, supra 
note 197, ¶¶ 53–54, 56–57, 65, 68–69. See also id. ¶ 69 (referring to police and prosecutor 
investigative reports concerning suspect questioning). 
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apparently endorsed these responses, or activities, specifically when 
conducted by police or prosecutors.
264
  
But what this seemingly more narrow conception of “investigation” 
fails to adequately take into account is that some post-conflict societies 
choose other methods to address periods of grave crimes. For example, 
post-conflict nations that fear political instability if prosecutions or 
associated police investigations of “high-level” criminals occur, including 
a possible return to a period of abuse, perhaps by these very criminals 
and/or their associates who may attempt to gain and/or return to power to 
avoid prosecution, may opt instead to institute a truth commission or 
similar process (i.e., either exclusively or in addition to criminal 
investigations and prosecutions).
265
 Truth commissions, though they do 
investigate crime, ordinarily do not involve formal investigations by police 
or prosecutors.
266
 In addition, while truth commissions may investigate, in 
 
 
 264. See supra note 198 (referring to the contents of the police or public prosecutions’ reports 
concerning questioning of suspects.). See also supra note 210. 
 265. See Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, 58 (1998). “When the societal 
goals include restoring dignity to victims, offering a basis for individual healing, and also promoting 
reconciliation across a divided nation, a truth commission again may be as powerful or more powerful 
than prosecutions.” Id. at 88-89. Apparently, Kenya has actually made the claim that an accountability 
process involving the high-profile criminals who allegedly committed the international crimes in 
Kenya is undesirable because it presents a danger to peace and stability. This is because many of these 
alleged criminals are also high-profile politicians in Kenya. See Thomas Obel Hansen, Transitional 
Justice in Kenya? An Assessment of the Accountability Process in Light of Domestic Politics and 
Security Concerns, 41 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 1 (2011). Kenya’s truth commission has also recently 
completed its investigation into crimes and human rights abuses occurring from December 12, 1963 to 
February 28, 2008, and submitted its final report. See Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission of 
Kenya, Report of The Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission (“TRJC”) of Kenya, 
http://www.tjrckenya.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=573&Itemid=238. See also 
TRJC to Submit Its Final Report, TJRCKenya.org (Apr. 30, 2013), http://www.tjrckenya.org/index. 
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=571:tjrc-to-submit-its-final-report&catid=1:tjrc-news& 
Itemid=187 (last visited Aug. 24, 2013) (explaining date and methods of submission of final report). 
See also The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Act (2008), Cap 2 § 5 (a) Kenya, available at 
http://www.tjrckenya.org/images/documents/TJRC-Act.pdf (last visited Aug. 24, 2013) (explaining 
temporal limitations on truth commission investigations). Post-apartheid South Africa is one example 
of a nation choosing a truth commission process to address a period of human rights abuses and 
conflict. If an individual appeared before the South African truth commission and admitted all of the 
facts underlying their “political” crime, amnesty from prosecution was provided. Azanian Peoples 
Org. v. President of S. Afr. 1996 (4) SA 637 (CC), ¶¶ 5, 32 (S. Afr.), available at http://www.saflii. 
org/za/cases/ZACC/1996/16.pdf.  
 266. See Priscilla Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions—1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study, 16 
HUM RTS. Q. 597, 604 (1994).  
First, a truth commission focuses on the past. Second, a truth commission is not focused on a 
specific event, but attempts to paint the overall picture of certain human rights abuses, or 
violations of international humanitarian law, over a period of time. Third, a truth commission 
usually exists temporarily and for a pre-defined period of time, ceasing to exist with the 
submission of a report of its findings. Finally, a truth commission is always vested with some 
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part, to determine overall or even individual responsibility for crimes, they 
neither conduct criminal prosecutions nor render formal convictions or 
sentencing reflecting a determination of guilt.
267
 Nonetheless, these 
commission investigations by states may have direct, tangible 
consequences for individuals, such as community service assignments, 
reparation payments to victims, apologies to victims, lustration, etc., as 
well as less tangible ones.
268
 
 
 
sort of authority, by way of its sponsor, that allows it greater access to information, greater 
security or protection to dig into sensitive issues, and a greater impact with its report. 
Id. 
 267. Id. at 600. See also Minow, supra note 265, at 58, 78. “[A] truth commission is charged to 
produce a public report that recounts the facts gathered, and render moral assessment. It casts its 
findings and conclusions not in terms of individual blame but instead in terms of what was wrong and 
never justifiable.” Id. at 78. The Kenya truth commission was responsible for and did determine both 
overall and individual responsibility for crimes and human rights abuses. With regard to individual 
responsibility, the Kenya commission either determined that individuals should be banned from 
serving in public office in Kenya and/or be investigated and/or prosecuted by the appropriate Kenyan 
authorities for particular abuses and crimes. See The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Act, supra note 
265, § 5(a)–(d). See also infra note 276 (explaining lustration and recommendations to Kenyan 
prosecutor’s office for investigation and prosecution). 
 268. Hayner, supra note 266, at 604, 609. Truth commissions may also recommend “military and 
police reform, the strengthening of democratic institutions, measures to promote national 
reconciliation, . . . or reform of the judicial system.” Id. See also U.N. Transitional Administration in 
East Timor (UNTAET), Regulation No. 2001/10, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2001/10 (July 13, 2001) 
[hereinafter CAVR], available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/untaetR/ 
Reg10e.pdf. CAVR stands for Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation, a truth 
commission organized by the United Nations in response to decades of violence in East Timor. Id. 
§ 2.1. Note that as part of CAVR, there was an “admission of responsibility” requirement (i.e., 
individuals who committed minor crimes could come before CAVR and if they admitted responsibility 
for their crimes and met certain other requirements, they may receive an “act of reconciliation.” Id. 
§§ 23.1, 27.7, & sched. 1. See also Minow, supra note 265, at 78. 
Trial records do not seek a full historical account beyond the actions of particular individuals. 
[In contrast, truth commissions,] . . . [through] [c]lose historical analysis of testimonies and 
documents . . . [revealing] the influences of [numerous circumstances behind the mass 
violence] . . . can do more than verdicts of guilt or innocence to produce a record for the 
nation and the world, and a recasting of the past to develop bases for preventing future 
atrocities. 
Id. at 78–79. Minow argues that truth commissions provide a chance for victims to tell their story and 
“be heard without interruption or skepticism[.]” Id. at 58. “[T]ruth commission[s] can give context to 
the human rights violations, and remind a viewing public of the human costs that were suppressed or 
unknown.” Id. at 76. In its final report, the Kenya truth commission made recommendations for 
lustration for particular perpetrators of human rights abuses in Kenya. See infra note 275. The Kenya 
truth commission also made recommendations related to the provision of reparations (compensation 
for injuries, memorials, apologies, community facilities, etc.) for the victims of human rights abuses. 
See Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya, Report of The Truth, Justice, and 
Reconciliation Commission (“TJRC”) of Kenya, vol. 4, ch. 3 (May 13, 2013) [hereinafter Final Report 
of the Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission Vol. 4], available at http://www. tjrckenya.org/ 
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=573&Itemid=238. See also id. at 63, Annex 
“Recommendations and Implementation Matrix.” All of the recommendations made by the truth 
commission, including ones related to reparations, lustration, further investigation and possible 
prosecution of crime by Kenyan authorities, are binding. See The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
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Thus, it appears likely that in light of the interpretation given by the 
PTC and Appeals Chamber in the Kenya case as to what qualifies as 
“investigations” by states under the complementarity principle, most state-
initiated truth commission processes will be excluded.
269
 Accordingly, 
cases may still be deemed admissible before the ICC notwithstanding a 
state’s decision to address a period of crime and human rights abuses 
exclusively through a legitimate truth commission process (or similar, 
local practice). This is troublesome insofar as it prevents states from 
responding to grave crimes occurring within their borders in specific ways 
that they believe will best lead to reconciliation and overall stability within 
the framework of their particular, national “context.” Such a narrow 
interpretation of “investigation” for purposes of the complementarity 
assessment leaves states less flexibility and ultimately less power over 
their preferred solutions to mass crime.  
Interestingly, in the Kenya case, both the dissenting opinion of Judge 
Usacka in the Appeals Chamber’s admissibility decision implicating 
complementarity as well as some commentators have suggested that 
Kenya should have been given more time to submit additional information 
to the ICC about its investigations of those committing international 
crimes in Kenya as part of the post-election violence period, or 
alternatively, more time in general to investigate or prosecute these 
crimes.
270
 While it is true that the ICC summonses against particular 
 
 
Act, 2008, supra note 265, § 50(2) (“All recommendations shall be implemented, and where the 
implementation of any recommendation has not been complied with, the National Assembly shall 
require the Minister to furnish it with reasons for non-implementation.”). In this regard, the Kenyan 
truth commission set up an implementation mechanism, or committee, to oversee implementation of 
the commission’s recommendations. See id. art. 48 (2); See also Final Report of The Truth, Justice, 
and Reconciliation Commission (“TRJC”) of Kenya, Vol. 4, chap. 2, available at http://www. 
tjrckenya.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=573&Itemid=238 (last visited Aug. 
24, 2013).  
 269. It is possible to read the PTC and Appeals Chambers Article 19 admissibility decisions in the 
Kenya case as permitting a narrow class of truth commissions to qualify as “investigations” for 
complementarity purposes. For example, occasionally a truth commission will seek to determine 
individual criminal responsibility and assign a “punishment” based on that determination. See CAVR, 
supra note 268, at 23.1 & 27.7. But even then, the punishment does not take the form of the traditional, 
punitive, and retribution-oriented form of criminal sentencing (i.e., prison or jail time) but rather is 
more reconciliation and rehabilitation-oriented (i.e., apologies, community service, etc.). Perhaps most 
importantly, even in this example (i.e., East Timor), the determination of responsibility and “act of 
reconciliation” were not made by police officers, prosecutors or other “traditional” criminal justice 
actors such as judges or juries. Rather, the truth commission officers made these decisions. There is 
some doubt following the Article 19 admissibility decisions in the Kenya case whether investigations 
by individuals other than “traditional” criminal justice actors would qualify (i.e., as “investigations” by 
the state under the complementarity principle). See supra notes 263 & 264 and accompanying text.  
 270. See Article 19 Appeal, supra note 200, ¶ 26 (Usaka, J., dissenting) ([“The ICC Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence] gives the Chamber power to take all measures necessary, including 
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suspects for specific crimes did not issue until March 8, 2011, and the 
admissibility decision by the ICC occurred approximately three months 
later on May 30, 2011, Kenya knew of the ICC’s intent to investigate and 
potentially prosecute particular international crimes (e.g., crimes against 
humanity) on November 26, 2009 at the latest, which is the date of the 
Prosecutor’s application to the PTC to initiate his investigation proprio 
motu.
271
  
In the approximately sixteen months between the proprio motu request 
and the date of Kenya’s filing of the admissibility challenge (March 31, 
2011), Kenya did not make sufficiently substantial efforts to investigate or 
prosecute serious international or domestic crimes committed during the 
post-election violence (either under the “same person, substantially same 
conduct” test posited by the Appeals Chamber in its admissibility decision 
or under the more flexible standard suggested in this Article). It clearly did 
not, as noted by the PTC and Appeals Chambers, “interview[] witnesses or 
suspects, collect[] documentary evidence, or carry[] out forensic analyses” 
of persons who were suspected of involvement in the serious crimes 
related to the post-election violence.
272
 In addition, at the time of and 
during the 16-month period prior to the admissibility decision, Kenya had 
apparently failed to question any suspect, victim or witness about grave 
international or domestic criminal incidents related to the post-election 
 
 
requesting more information or extending time to allow the State to present additional material. In the 
specific context of the case at hand, the Pre-Trial Chamber should have properly considered to make 
use of such powers.”). Id. See also Jalloh, supra note 202, at 123–24 (“[O]ne solution could have been 
for the Court to suspend or defer the prosecutor’s investigation to give Kenya an opportunity to 
conduct its own prosecution of the suspects while the ICC prosecutor would closely monitor the 
ongoing investigation to ensure that it remained devoted to the same ‘case.’ Article 18(2) of the Rome 
Statute provides the framework for such a deferral, even if the ‘within one month’ time limitation 
makes the provision not entirely applicable to this stage of the Kenya situation. Such a halfway 
solution would have numerous advantages over the Court’s outright dismissal of the admissibility 
application and would have assuaged the government’s and dissent’s rightful concern about the future 
of the complementarity bargain struck at Rome.”). 
 271. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 18 (1) (“When . . . the Prosecutor initiates an 
investigation pursuant to articles 13 (c) and 15, the Prosecutor shall notify all States Parties and those 
States which, taking into account the information available, would normally exercise jurisdiction over 
the crimes concerned. The Prosecutor may notify such States on a confidential basis and, where the 
Prosecutor believes it necessary to protect persons, prevent destruction of evidence or prevent the 
absconding of persons, may limit the scope of the information provided to States.”). For the relevant 
dates, see Request for Authorisation of an Investigation Pursuant to Article 15, supra note 86 (Nov. 
26, 2009); Prosecutor v. Ruto, supra note 192 (Mar. 8, 2011) and Article 19 Decision, supra note 197 
(May 30, 2011). The “tight” timeframe between the summonses and the admissibility decisions is also 
discussed by Judge Usacka in her dissenting opinion. See Article 19 Appeal, supra note 200, ¶ 28 
(dissenting op. J. Usacka). The Prosecutor’s request to initiate an investigation proprio motu was 
approved on March 31, 2010. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 272. See Judgment on the Appeal of the Republic of Kenya Against the Decision of Pre-Trial 
Chamber, supra note 211, ¶ 1. 
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violence.
273
 The information it had gathered about Mr. Ruto was minimal 
at best, and the rest of its efforts had gone into prosecuting low-level, 
domestic crimes.
274
  
Furthermore, though Kenya did commence and has recently completed 
a truth commission process in response to multiple periods of grave crimes 
committed within its territory, it specifically exempted from any immunity 
or amnesty from prosecution perpetrators of serious international 
crimes.
275
 This approach along with specific recommendations made by 
the truth commission for Kenyan prosecutors to investigate and/or 
possibly prosecute alleged perpetrators of grave crimes, including 
perpetrators of the post-election violence, reflects a general desire on the 
part of Kenya, at least in theory, to prosecute (i.e., as opposed to choosing 
the truth commission process as an exclusive means to address grave 
crime).
276
 Had Kenya chosen through some representative, democratic 
 
 
 273. See supra text accompanying note 198, 212. 
 274. See Article 19 Appeal, supra note 200, ¶ 8 (Usacka, J., dissenting). 
With respect to Mr. Ruto, [the] information had indicated that a case file had been opened, 
referred to him as a “suspect,” indicated his case file number and stated where the case was 
pending. It also provided information as to the scope of the investigations and the allegations 
against Mr. Ruto, including the location and time of the alleged criminal conduct. Further, it 
indicated that orders had been given, apparently by the authorities in charge, to start 
investigations against the other five persons under investigation by the Court, too.  
Id. See also supra note 212. For the investigation and prosecution of minor, less serious offenses by 
the Kenyan authorities related to the post-election violence, see supra notes 97, 177. 
 275. See The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Act, supra note 265, art. 34 (1)–(3).  
A person may make an application for consideration of amnesty to the Commission for any 
act or omission which constitutes a matter to be investigated under this Act; (2) The 
Commission may in accordance with this Part, and subject to subsection (3), recommend the 
grant of conditional amnesty to any person liable to any penalty under any law in Kenya.; 
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2), no amnesty may be recommended by the Commission in 
respect of genocide, crimes against humanity, gross violation of human rights or an act, 
omission or offence constituting a gross violation of human right including extrajudicial 
execution, enforced disappearance, sexual assault, rape and torture. 
Note that in order to obtain a recommendation for amnesty by the commission under the Act, the 
person seeking amnesty had to make a “full disclosure of all relevant facts[.]” Id. art. 38(2)(b) & art. 5 
(f). Finally, note that no amnesties were actually granted by the Kenyan truth commission. See Final 
Report, Kenyan Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission: Volume 4, supra note 265, at 4 (“The 
Commission was also mandated to recommend the grant of amnesty in respect of certain offences. 
However, as explained in the mandate chapter of this Report, the Commission did not process any 
amnesty applications and as such no recommendations pertaining to amnesty have been made.”). The 
period of investigation of crimes by the Kenyan truth commission spanned from 1963 to 2008. See 
infra note 277. 
 276. See Final Report, Kenyan Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission, Volume 4, supra 
note 265, at iv., 128 (Appendix 1). (“Justice is further achieved by the recommendations the 
Commission made with respect to further investigations and prosecutions, set out in Appendix 1 of 
Chapter 1 of this Volume”). Notably, lustration was also recommended for particular Kenyan officials. 
Id. at 6.  
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method a truth commission process as its unique means to address all 
grave, post-election crime, and this process was legitimately unfolding or 
had been completed at the time of the ICC admissibility decision, then 
these facts should have influenced the Court in its decision regarding 
complementarity, whether in the way of the Court deferring the case to 
national authorities, or providing Kenya with additional time to finish its 
domestic process. This was simply not the case in Kenya. Indeed, Kenya’s 
basic intent, in theory, to withhold amnesty for perpetrators of grave 
crimes over multiple time periods and instead prosecute them has not 
borne itself out in practice; on the contrary, the recent findings and 
recommendations of the Kenyan truth commission support the notion that 
many of these perpetrators, including those allegedly responsible for the 
post-election violence, have neither been prosecuted nor sufficiently 
investigated.
277
  
 
 
However, the prevalence of impunity throughout the history of Kenya compelled the 
Commission to consider lustration for past abuses committed by individuals while acting in 
an official capacity. The Commission considered that tackling impunity is a necessary and 
urgent step in the full restoration of the rule of law in Kenya, in establishing lasting peace and 
stability, and in fostering reconciliation. For this reason, the Commission has recommended 
that specific individuals should not hold public office in Kenya’s constitutional order on 
account of their past conduct and/or decisions which resulted in gross violations of human 
rights. 
Id. For examples of individuals receiving the penalty of lustration by the Kenyan truth commission, 
see id. at 128 (Appendix 1 chart). 
 277. See Final Report, Kenyan Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission, Volume 4, supra 
note 265, at 128 (Appendix 1). Examples of individuals the Commission found have not been 
investigated adequately or prosecuted for the post-election violence are mentioned at the following 
numbers (#’s) in the chart entitled “List of Adversely Mentioned Persons and Recommendations of the 
TJRC”—numbers 25, 26, 54, 90, 91, 93 & 95. Id. at 130, 135, 140. The commission recommends that 
the Kenyan prosecutor further investigate these individuals for alleged crimes, including killings and 
attacks leading to the loss of lives, related to the post-election violence. See also id. ¶ 13.  
With respect to recommendations concerning the investigation and possible prosecution of an 
individual, the following shall apply: The DPP [Kenyan Director of Public Prosecutions] or 
appropriate authority shall immediately commence an investigation into the individual 
named. Unless otherwise provided in the specific recommendations, such an investigation 
shall conclude no later than twelve months after the issuance of this Report. At the 
completion of such investigation the DPP or appropriate authority shall make an immediate 
determination concerning whether the evidence warrants a criminal prosecution. The DPP or 
appropriate authority shall immediately make that determination public, and shall include in 
that public statement detailed reasons justifying its decision. 
In addition to individuals whom the Commission concludes merit further investigation and possible 
prosecution related to the Kenyan post-election violence, the Commission also found numerous 
incidents throughout modern Kenyan history where the government had not sufficiently investigated 
or prosecuted alleged perpetrators of crimes and human rights abuses. See generally id. at 128 
(Appendix 1). See also id. at 10, ¶ 35. 
The Commission finds that the following factors encouraged the perpetuation of gross 
violations of human rights during the mandate period: [inter alia]: Consolidation of immense 
powers in the person of the President, coupled with the deliberate erosion of the independence 
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And significantly, this absence of discernible, qualifying investigative 
or prosecutorial activity on the part of Kenya related to the post-election 
violence was not due to some fundamental lack of opportunity for Kenya 
to show, or “prove,” its efforts before the ICC, though the Court could 
perhaps have been more cooperative in sharing its own investigative 
information related to the case with Kenya.
278
 
 
 
of both the Judiciary and the Legislature. The failure of the state to investigate and punish 
gross violations of human rights. The Commission finds that in most cases, the state has 
covered-up or downplayed violations committed against its own citizens, especially those 
committed by state security agencies. During the entire mandate period (1963–2008), the state 
demonstrated no genuine commitment to investigate and punish atrocities and violations 
committed by its agents against innocent citizens. 
Id. (italics supplied). See id. ¶ 64 (“The Commission is not aware of a single criminal conviction for 
any massacre committed by the security forces in Kenya during the mandate period.”) See also id. 
¶ 66.  
The Commission made formal requests to the [Kenyan] Ministry of Defence for information 
in respect of the role of the Army in the Shifta War and other massacres but no response was 
received. The Commission finds it regrettable that the Ministry of Defence chose to ignore or 
refuse the request, and thus to act in clear violation of the provisions of the TJR Act. In so 
doing the Ministry of Defence has undermined Kenya’s truth and reconciliation process. 
Id. 
 278. In particular, the PTC gave Kenya ample opportunity to prove it had taken the requisite steps 
to investigate or prosecute by allowing Kenya to file annexes with additional information, and to reply 
to submissions by other parties in this regard, including submissions by the prosecutor. See Article 19 
Appeal, supra note 200, ¶ 98. And under the terms of the Rome Statute, it appears Kenya could (and 
should) have waited until it had made “serious” efforts to investigate and/ or prosecute international 
crimes related to the post-election violence before making its admissibility challenge on 
complementarity grounds. According to Article 19(5) of the Statute, Kenya should have waited to 
make its article 19 admissibility challenge at the “earliest opportunity[,]” which refers to “the earliest 
point in time after the conflict of jurisdictions has actually arisen.” See Article 19 Appeal, supra note 
200, ¶ 100. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber noted that “[a] State cannot expect to be allowed to 
amend an admissibility challenge or to submit additional supporting evidence just because the State 
made the challenge prematurely.” Id. (emphasis added). Finally, though the PTC had prohibited an 
oral hearing to allow the Kenyan Police Commissioner to present more facts, this information could 
have been provided in writing. See id. ¶¶ 110, 111. Regarding the decision by the Appeals Chamber 
not to compel the Prosecutor or the Court to share investigative information with Kenya, see id. 
¶¶ 116, 122–23 (finding that the PTC’s denial of Kenya’s request for assistance to obtain evidence in 
possession of the Court and Prosecutor related to ICC investigations into post election violence in 
Kenya, including information related to the six suspects before the ICC, does not “amount to a 
procedural error vitiating the [PTC’s] Decision.” ). Id. ¶¶ 116, 122. According to the Appeals 
Chamber, the PTC, under the Court’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, has “discretion” in deciding 
whether and what information to share. See id. ¶ 123. More recently, in the ICC case against President 
Kenyatta, the ICC Prosecutor had apparently refused to reveal the identity of certain witnesses out of a 
concern for their security. Defendant Kenyatta had demanded the release of these identities to both 
assist with his defense and in order for Kenya itself to begin investigating and prosecuting these 
individuals for crimes committed during the post-election violence. Kenyatta also opposed an attempt 
by the Prosecutor to grant the witnesses immunity for any testimony they provide. See 
Mwakilishi.com, dated 11/12/13, available at http://www.mwakilishi.com/content/articles/2013/11/ 
12/president-uhuru-kenyatta-wants-15-mungiki-icc-witnesses-charged.html (last visited Apr. 13, 
2014). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss4/7
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In short, Kenya, because of its clear lack of sustained activity related to 
the investigation and prosecution of grave international or domestic crimes 
occurring during the post-election violence, should not have been granted 
additional time by the ICC in its admissibility decision to submit 
additional proof or to further advance its investigative efforts. 
Notwithstanding this conclusion, Kenya can certainly begin seriously 
investigating and/ or prosecuting the grave crimes committed during the 
post-election incidents by ICC defendants whose trials have not yet begun, 
and if it does so, attempt to re-challenge admissibility under the “same 
person, substantially same conduct” test at any time prior to the 
commencement of the trial.
279
 This possibility, though perhaps made 
somewhat challenging by the majority’s strict “same person/conduct” test, 
does allow a state party like Kenya yet a further opportunity to exercise its 
sovereignty by taking appropriate steps to address grave crimes on its own 
without ICC involvement. 
CONCLUSION 
Through a series of pretrial decisions in the Kenya case, the PTC and 
Appeals Chamber of the ICC have already set several important 
 
 
 279. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 19 (4) (“The admissibility of a case or the jurisdiction of 
the Court may be challenged only once by any person or State . . . . The challenge shall take place 
prior to or at the commencement of the trial. In exceptional circumstances, the Court may grant leave 
for a challenge to be brought more than once or at a time later than the commencement of the trial. 
Challenges to the admissibility of a case, at the commencement of a trial, or subsequently with the 
leave of the Court, may be based only on article 17, paragraph 1 (c) [i.e., the ne bis id idem 
principle].”). Id. 
 Note that under the second prong, or limb, of the complementarity inquiry, any Kenyan 
investigations or prosecutions related to the post-election “grave” crimes would have to reflect an 
ability and willingness to genuinely investigate or prosecute. In addition, a decision not to prosecute 
one of these crimes could not stem from an inability or unwillingness to genuinely prosecute (i.e., a 
person for these crimes). See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17 (1) (a) & (b). This second prong 
could conceivably pose a challenge for Kenya. See supra note 277.”). Id. See also id. art. 19(10) (“If 
the Court has decided that a case is inadmissible under article 17, the Prosecutor may submit a request 
for a review of the decision when he or she is fully satisfied that new facts have arisen which negate 
the basis on which the case had previously been found inadmissible under article 17.”). Id. Note that 
recently Kenya has shown its general unwillingness to assist the ICC through a vote by its Parliament 
to officially withdraw from the Rome Statute as a State Party. See “Kenya Parliament votes to 
withdraw from ICC” (dated Aug. 5, 2013), available at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/ 
09/201395151027359326.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2014) (noting that Kenya’s legal obligations under 
the Rome Statute remain intact for those Kenyan defendants whose prosecutions have begun before 
the Court). Moreover, Kenya apparently seeks various amendments to the Rome Statute, including 
provisions that would essentially provide immunity for prosecution to sitting heads of state and other 
government officials. See “Justice in Conflict—Kenyatta’s Next Move: What Kenya Wants from the 
ICC” (posted 11/13/13), available at http://justiceinconflict.org/2013/11/13/kenyattas-next-move-
what-kenya-wants-from-the-icc/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2014). 
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precedents that will guide future adjudication by the Court. While 
revealing the potency of the ICC Prosecutor’s proprio motu power, the 
Kenya case also establishes certain “hurdles” the Prosecutor must 
overcome prior to being able to exercise her power. In addition, the Kenya 
case highlights the seriousness with which the PTC views its supervisory 
role over proprio motu investigations by the Prosecutor.  
On a separate note, the Kenya case further elucidates the principle of 
complementarity, a fundamental concept embedded in the ICC Rome 
Statute from its inception. Following the admissibility decisions by the 
PTC and Appeals Chamber in the case, it will be somewhat difficult for a 
state party to successfully show before the Court that it is “investigating or 
prosecuting a case” under the complementarity principle and is therefore 
entitled to deference with respect to that case by the ICC. This is for two 
principal reasons: (1) before the ICC defers a case to the state under the 
complementarity principle, the state must show that it is investigating or 
prosecuting the same person(s) for substantially the same conduct as the 
ICC; and (2) the types of investigative approaches that “qualify” under the 
Court’s definition of “investigation” for purposes of the complementarity 
principle are relatively narrow in scope (i.e., the investigations apparently 
must entail “traditional” criminal justice methods used by police or 
prosecutors).  
 Thus, truth commissions or other “local” mechanisms to address mass 
crime chosen by a state as a result of some participatory, democratic 
process will likely not qualify under the Court’s definition. This is 
troublesome insofar as it imposes the Court’s view regarding appropriate 
responses to mass crime and in the process undermines legitimate efforts 
by a state to handle a period of abuse in ways that may account for its 
potentially distinct or unique national context. In short, the “same person, 
substantially the same conduct” test for complementarity, at least as 
articulated by the Court in the Kenya case, has the potential to encroach 
further on the exercise of a sovereign state’s authority to investigate and/ 
or prosecute international crimes occurring within its borders.  
Finally, Kenya, either under the strict complementarity test developed 
by the Court or under a more lenient test of the kind put forward in this 
Article, did not sufficiently investigate or prosecute grave crimes related to 
the post-election violence at the time of the admissibility decision by the 
Court in the case; however, Kenya still has an opportunity with regard to 
defendants whose trials have not yet begun, to commence national 
investigative activities that would meet the “same-person, substantially the 
same conduct” test. The recent Kenyan truth commission report indicates 
that much work remains for Kenya to do in this regard.  
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